White v. Register of Wills of Anne Arundel County
217 Md. App. 187
| Md. Ct. Spec. App. | 2014Background
- White was the former Chief Deputy Register of Wills for Anne Arundel County, terminated January 31, 2012.
- She claimed termination retaliation for a December 19, 2011 whistleblower complaint filed with DBM under Md. Code § 5-305.
- DBM dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, stating White was a judicial branch employee; whistleblower statute applies to executive branch employees only.
- OAH affirmed DBM’s jurisdiction ruling; circuit court affirmed, and White sought judicial review.
- The central issue is whether White’s role makes her an executive or judicial branch employee for purposes of the whistleblower statute.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Is White an executive or judicial employee for whistleblower purposes? | White argues statutes make her executive branch employee due to Comptroller oversight. | Defendants contend White is a judicial employee; Comptroller oversight does not convert her to executive. | White is a judicial branch employee. |
| Does Comptroller authority over staff convert the Register of Wills staff to executive branch employees? | Comptroller power to set salaries/number of deputies implies executive status for staff. | Comptroller acts as fiscal watchdog; lacks authority to supervise or hire/fire for core duties. | No conversion; Comptroller oversight does not make staff executive. |
| Does the Chief Deputy’s alter-ego role with the Register of Wills affect branch classification? | Chief Deputy acts with register’s authority, suggesting executive status. | Chief Deputy acts as alter ego but the position is still part of judicial administration. | Chief Deputy is classified as a judicial employee. |
| Does separation of powers doctrine raise concerns if White were an executive employee? | Executive status would permit inappropriate executive control over judicial staff. | Separation of powers allows fiscal controls without undermining core judicial functions. | No constitutional separation-of-powers violation; classification as judicial employee is permissible. |
| What is the proper standard of review for the agency’s decision? | N/A | N/A | Court applies substantial-evidence and correct-law review to agency findings. |
Key Cases Cited
- Doe v. Montgomery Cnty. Bd. of Elections, 406 Md. 697 (2008) (statutory interpretation and agency review standards)
- Motor Vehicle Admin. v. Shea, 415 Md. 1 (2010) (standard of review for administrative decisions)
- United Parcel Service, Inc. v. People’s Counsel for Baltimore County, 336 Md. 569 (1994) (scope of administrative agency review and deference)
- Rucker v. Harford Cnty., 316 Md. 275 (1989) (alter ego concept for agency classification of deputies)
- Shell Oil Co. v. Supervisor of Assessments of Prince George's Cnty., 276 Md. 36 (1975) (separation of powers and non-judicial functions)
- O’Hara v. Kovens, 92 Md. App. 9 (1992) (separation of powers and administrative role limits)
- Baltimore v. State, 15 Md. 376 (1860) (early separation-of-powers interpretation)
- McCulloch v. Glendening, 347 Md. 272 (1997) (elastic interpretation of separation of powers)
- Attorney General v. Waldron, 289 Md. 683 (1981) (constitutional limits on executive action)