White v. Premo, 443 P.3d 608

Laycelle White and his twin brother Lydell were convicted of aggravated murder and murder; Laycelle received life with parole for one murder and an 800‑month determinate sentence for the other.
White was a juvenile at the time of the offenses; the 800‑month sentence effectively prevents release until age 81, prompting a Miller challenge.
In a post‑conviction petition, White argued Miller v. Alabama requires that a juvenile receive individualized consideration and that life‑without‑parole (or de facto life) sentences be imposed only if the juvenile is irreparably corrupted.
The sentencing court emphasized White’s appreciation of the brutality and the need to protect society, noted opportunities to control behavior, and declined to find or attribute a psychological disorder as causative.
The trial and post‑conviction courts had dismissed relief; the Court of Appeals affirmed; the Oregon Supreme Court reversed and remanded, finding the record did not show the sentencing court made the requisite Miller‑type irreparable‑corruption finding.
The court took limited judicial notice of sentencing materials but declined to adopt broader extra‑record materials without usual trial‑level procedures.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Does Miller apply to de facto life sentences (very long determinate terms)?	White: Miller applies; an 800‑month term is de facto life and triggers Miller protections.	State: Miller does not necessarily apply or the record shows compliance.	Miller protections apply to de facto life terms; court applies Miller.
Did the 800‑month sentence here function as a de facto life sentence?	White: The sentence effectively denies release until age 81, so it is de facto life.	State: Characterized sentence as different or argued sentencing rationale sufficed.	Court treated the 800‑month sentence as subject to Miller.
Did the sentencing court make the required finding of irreparable corruption?	White: Record lacks an explicit Miller‑style finding that he is irreparably corrupted.	State: Sentencing statements (appreciation of brutality; protection of society) suffice to show consideration of youth and conclude nontransience.	Court: Record does not show the required conclusion; remand for further proceedings.
May the appellate court take judicial notice of sentencing materials not before the post‑conviction court?	White: Asked court to take notice of the sentencing transcript to evaluate Miller compliance.	State: Also asked for broader notice of materials before sentencing court.	Court took limited judicial notice of requested materials (e.g., transcript) but declined to routinely take broader extra‑record evidence without trial‑level processes.

Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012) (juveniles may not be sentenced to life without parole unless offender is irreparably corrupted)
White v. Premo, 365 Or. 1 (2019) (companion opinion addressing twin Lydell; Miller applies to de facto life; remand where record lacked irreparable‑corruption finding)
Kinkel v. Persson, 363 Or. 1 (2018) (case in which the court found a very long sentence complied with Miller based on sentencing findings)
Eklof v. Steward, 360 Or. 717 (2016) (discussing judicial notice of court records)