White, Garcia Glen
506 S.W.3d 39
Tex. Crim. App.2016Background
- Applicant (Garcia Glen White) filed a subsequent habeas application under Texas Code Crim. Proc. art. 11.073 alleging newly discovered scientific evidence (a 2009 paper on cocaine-induced psychosis) would likely have altered a jury’s answers to a special issue in his capital trial.
- The Court previously held two of applicant’s claims barred as subsequent applications; this application raises whether Article 11.073 covers evidence that would affect only the punishment phase.
- Article 11.073 permits habeas relief if new scientific evidence, unavailable at trial, would show by a preponderance that the person “would not have been convicted.”
- The majority construes that phrase to require undermining the verdict or finding of guilt (guilt phase), not evidence affecting only punishment.
- The majority relies on prior construction of identical language in the post-conviction DNA-testing statute (Chapter 64 / Ex parte Gutierrez) and statutory interpretation principles; it concludes the legislature knew of that construction when enacting Article 11.073.
- The Court dismissed the application; Justice Alcala dissented, arguing the word “convicted” is ambiguous and Article 11.073 should be construed (under Article 11.04 and extratextual factors) to include death-penalty sentencing-phase evidence.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Article 11.073’s phrase “would not have been convicted” includes punishment-phase (death-penalty) findings | White: “convicted” should include sentencing-phase death determinations; new science that would change special-issue answers should qualify | State: plain meaning confines “convicted” to guilt-phase verdicts; statute does not reach punishment-only evidence | Held: “would not have been convicted” unambiguously requires undermining guilt; punishment-only evidence is not within Article 11.073 |
| Whether prior Chapter 64/DNA jurisprudence controls construction of identical phrase | White: Chapter 64 is not a habeas statute and Article 11.04 favors broader habeas constructions | State: Ex parte Gutierrez construed identical language to exclude punishment-only claims; legislature enacted 11.073 aware of that construction | Held: Gutierrez and identical statutory language support limiting Article 11.073 to guilt-phase claims |
| Whether Article 11.073, interpreted narrowly, violates separation of powers or due process in death cases | White: “death is different”; legislature cannot bar courts from considering sentencing-phase new evidence | State: Legislature may create and limit statutory remedies; courts must follow statute’s text; procedural rules do not require broader postconviction relief | Held: No constitutional violation; legislature may limit a statutory remedy and courts cannot grant relief beyond statute’s terms |
| Whether Article 11.073 encompasses “innocence of the death penalty” claims | White/Amici: new science could show ineligibility for death and thus should qualify | State: federal “innocence of death” exception is distinct, requires higher proof and negation of eligibility; Article 11.073 uses lower preponderance standard and was not intended to reach that concept | Held: Article 11.073’s preponderance standard and text do not encompass the federal ‘‘innocence of the death penalty’’ framework; such sentencing claims require other avenues |
Key Cases Cited
- Ex parte Evans, 964 S.W.2d 643 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) (discusses meaning of "conviction" in habeas context)
- Ex parte Gutierrez, 337 S.W.3d 883 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (Chapter 64 construed: identical phrase does not cover punishment-only effects)
- Ex parte Robbins, 478 S.W.3d 678 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (legislative history and purpose of Article 11.073 discussed)
- Ex parte White, 485 S.W.3d 431 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016) (procedural ruling barring earlier claims as subsequent applications)
- Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333 (U.S. 1992) (federal framework for miscarriage-of-justice / death-penalty claims)
- Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (U.S. 2002) (jury role in findings necessary for death eligibility)
- Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 163 (U.S. 2006) (sentencing-system constitutionality and limits of DNA relevance to sentencing question)
- Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390 (U.S. 1993) (actual innocence and federal habeas principles)