Whitaker v. Wisconsin Department of Health Services
849 F.3d 681
| 7th Cir. | 2017Background
- Joyce Whitaker was an economic support specialist who worked on Milwaukee’s public assistance program and had a known chronic back disability for which the Department previously approved an accommodation (periodic standing/stretching).
- In 2010 Whitaker took consecutive medical and family leaves, repeatedly requested extensions, and ultimately exhausted available FMLA and contractual unpaid leave.
- Whitaker provided two brief doctor’s notes covering short extension intervals but no detailed medical evidence about treatment effectiveness or likelihood of a regular return.
- The Department warned Whitaker that no further extensions would be granted and that failure to return would prompt termination; she did not return and was fired on November 30, 2010.
- Whitaker sued under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act alleging the Department denied a reasonable accommodation (additional finite unpaid leave) and unlawfully terminated her.
- The district court granted summary judgment for the Department; the Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding Whitaker failed to show she was an "otherwise qualified" employee who could perform essential job functions with or without a reasonable accommodation.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Whitaker was an "otherwise qualified" employee under the Rehabilitation Act | Whitaker contends she could return to work regularly if given additional finite unpaid leave (accommodation) | Department argues she could not perform essential functions (regular attendance) and offered no proof additional leave would enable return | Held for Department: Whitaker failed to show she could perform essential functions with or without accommodation |
| Whether regular attendance was an essential function of the job | Whitaker argues attendance requirement could be accommodated | Department says job duties (phones, meetings, casework) require regular in-person attendance | Held: Regular attendance is an essential function; no evidence to the contrary |
| Whether the requested accommodation (additional unpaid leave) was reasonable or open-ended | Whitaker says request was a finite leave to recover and return by December 28, 2010 | Department characterizes the repeated, indefinite extension requests as effectively open-ended and burdensome | Held: Court need not resolve reasonableness because plaintiff failed the "otherwise qualified" element; record suggests leave requests were effectively open-ended |
| Whether termination was "solely by reason of" disability as required by Rehabilitation Act | Whitaker implies termination was due to disability-related leave | Department notes termination was tied to failure to return after approved leave and exhaustion of entitlements | Held: Court did not rest on this ground; primary basis was Whitaker’s failure to prove she was otherwise qualified |
Key Cases Cited
- Zerante v. DeLuca, 555 F.3d 582 (7th Cir.) (on viewing evidence in summary judgment context)
- Brumfield v. City of Chicago, 735 F.3d 619 (7th Cir.) (definition of "otherwise qualified" and incorporation of ADA standards)
- Felix v. Wisconsin Dep’t of Transportation, 828 F.3d 560 (7th Cir.) (elements of a Rehabilitation Act claim)
- Basden v. Professional Transportation, Inc., 714 F.3d 1034 (7th Cir.) (regular attendance is often an essential job function)
- Weigel v. Target Stores, 122 F.3d 461 (7th Cir.) (insufficiency of conclusory medical statements for accommodation showing)
- Amadio v. Ford Motor Co., 238 F.3d 919 (7th Cir.) (repeated extended leave requests can make further leave futile)
- Kotwica v. Rose Packing Co., 637 F.3d 744 (7th Cir.) (summary judgment burden to present evidence on each element)
- Widmar v. Sun Chemical Corp., 772 F.3d 457 (7th Cir.) (self‑serving affidavits may be considered but must be otherwise probative)