Wheeler v. State
327 Ga. App. 313
Ga. Ct. App.2014Background
- Victim M.N., age 15, met defendant Weyman E. Wheeler through his son; they developed a relationship and allegedly engaged in a sexual relationship beginning in late March 2011.
- Parents learned of the relationship in May 2011 after friends informed M.N.’s mother; M.N. admitted to the sexual relationship.
- Wheeler was indicted on aggravated child molestation, child molestation, statutory rape, and enticing a child for indecent purposes; jury convicted only on the enticing-a-child count, acquitted on aggravated molestation, and hung on two counts.
- At voir dire a prospective juror expressed sympathy toward children and difficulty being impartial; trial court denied Wheeler’s challenge for cause and Wheeler used a peremptory strike instead.
- Defense sought to admit a printed screenshot of a victim tweet for impeachment; trial court excluded the screenshot but the tweet was later read into evidence through another witness’s testimony.
- Jury instructions included the full statutory definition of "enticing a child for indecent purposes" (solicit, entice, or take) though the indictment alleged only that Wheeler "took" the child to his residence; jury asked during deliberations whether child molestation "requires sex," and the court directed the jury to re-read the charges and indictment.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (State) | Defendant's Argument (Wheeler) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Trial court refusal to strike juror for cause | Juror could be impartial despite sympathy for children | Juror admitted bias in favor of children and inability to be fair; challenge should be granted | Denied; court did not abuse discretion because juror did not have an unalterable fixed opinion and defendant used a peremptory strike |
| Exclusion of Twitter screenshot impeachment evidence | Tweet was not referenced by name and trial court properly excluded irrelevant screenshot | Screenshot was impeaching evidence showing victim’s obsession and should be admitted | No reversible error; tweet was effectively admitted via witness testimony, making exclusion harmless |
| Jury charged on full statutory definition vs. manner alleged in indictment | Full statute may be charged if charge overall limits jury to manner alleged | Charging entire statute expanded ways to convict beyond indictment (i.e., "solicit" or "entice") without limiting instruction | No plain error; overall charges and instruction that crime must be proved as in indictment cured any potential defect |
| Court response to jury question whether child molestation "requires sex" | Direct the jury to legal definition or provide a written clarification | Wheeler argued re-charge was inadequate | Waived by defense (agreed to instruction); no reversible error |
Key Cases Cited
- Powell v. State, 310 Ga. App. 144 (discussing juror impartiality in sexual-offense cases)
- Culajay v. State, 309 Ga. App. 631 (standards for striking jurors and demeanor evaluation)
- Daniel v. State, 296 Ga. App. 513 (juror bias toward children not disqualifying where juror can follow law)
- Burgess v. State, 292 Ga. 821 (trial-court discretion in evidentiary rulings)
- Boothe v. State, 293 Ga. 285 (harmlessness of excluded impeachment evidence when similar impeachment admitted)
- Mitchell v. State, 293 Ga. 1 (harmless-error analysis for excluded evidence)
- Lake v. State, 293 Ga. 56 (waiver where defense agreed to court’s re-charge decision)
- Jackson v. State, 274 Ga. App. 26 (no need to define "indecent act" to jury)