72 Cal.App.5th 824
Cal. Ct. App.2021Background
- Petitioner Emily Wheeler owned a commercial storefront in Los Angeles that she leased; tenant Omar Brown allegedly operated an unlicensed cannabis dispensary on the premises.
- Wheeler was charged under LAMC §§ 104.15(a)(1), 104.15(b)(4) (renting/letting property to unlicensed commercial cannabis activity) and LAMC § 12.21A.1(a) (use contrary to zoning).
- Wheeler moved to dismiss as void for vagueness and urged dismissal in the interests of justice (Pen. Code § 1385) because she was elderly, had no criminal history, and allegedly lacked knowledge of the illegal shop.
- The trial court dismissed the charges on its own motion under § 1385, citing Wheeler’s lack of knowledge and justice considerations.
- The People appealed; the appellate division reversed, holding the LAMC offenses are strict liability (no mens rea required) and the § 1385 dismissal was an abuse of discretion for relying on lack of knowledge.
- The Court of Appeal affirmed the appellate division: it held the LAMC provisions are not preempted by state law and the § 1385 dismissal based primarily on lack of knowledge was improper; petition for writ of mandate denied.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Preemption: Do state laws (MAUCRSA, UCSA, Penal Code § 373a / Health & Safety § 11366.5) preempt LAMC §§ 104.15 & 12.21A.1(a)? | Wheeler: State criminal/nuisance laws occupy the field or conflict because they require knowledge/notice; local laws duplicate or contradict state law. | People/City: MAUCRSA contemplates local licensing/zoning; local regulation of land use/licensing is preserved; LAMC targets unlicensed cannabis within City, not general drug crimes. | Court: No preemption. MAUCRSA disavows field preemption; LAMC regulates local licensing/zoning and public-welfare commercial cannabis activity and can impose strict liability. |
| Forfeiture: Was Wheeler’s preemption challenge forfeited by not raising it below? | Wheeler: May raise preemption on appeal because it is a pure legal question affecting authority to punish. | People: Should have been raised by demurrer/trial; forfeited. | Court: Not forfeited; pure legal issue fully briefed and decided on merits. |
| Mens rea: Do the LAMC offenses require proof of knowledge/intent (i.e., is strict liability impermissible here)? | Wheeler: Local strict liability conflicts with state statutes (which require knowledge for landlord drug offenses). | People/City: LAMC targets licensed status and local zoning/licensing compliance for open, regulated businesses; strict liability is appropriate for public-welfare regulation. | Court: Ordinances are strict liability public-welfare offenses and do not require proof of knowledge; no conflict with state law. |
| § 1385 dismissal: Did the trial court abuse discretion by dismissing based primarily on Wheeler’s lack of knowledge? | Wheeler: Dismissal appropriate given age, lack of record, and injustice of prosecution. | People: Dismissal based on lack of knowledge was improper because ordinances impose strict liability; court substituted its view of policy. | Court: Appellate division correctly found abuse of discretion; dismissal improperly relied on a legally irrelevant factor (lack of knowledge). Trial court may reconsider dismissal but not on that basis. |
Key Cases Cited
- People v. Williams, 17 Cal.4th 148 (1998) (standard and limits for § 1385 dismissal; abuse of discretion review)
- City of Riverside v. Inland Empire Patients Health & Wellness Center, Inc., 56 Cal.4th 729 (2013) (presumption against preemption for local land-use regulation)
- O’Connell v. City of Stockton, 41 Cal.4th 1061 (2007) (state’s comprehensive UCSA can occupy field for drug-related penalties)
- Kirby v. County of Fresno, 242 Cal.App.4th 940 (2015) (distinguishing local land-use/licensing regulation from local criminal penalties that are preempted)
- In re Jorge M., 23 Cal.4th 866 (2000) (public-welfare offenses may be strict liability)
- Barajas v. Appellate Division, 40 Cal.App.5th 944 (2019) (procedural route for reviewing appellate-division reversals of § 1385 dismissals)