Whatley v. State
415 S.W.3d 530
| Tex. App. | 2013Background
- Defendant Jerry Don Whatley was convicted by a Van Zandt County jury of aggravated sexual assault of a child by penetration; sentence 50 years; trial court also taxed court costs and attorney fees. The court of appeals reversed and acquitted.
- Victim (testified as Melany) described three incidents of sexual contact (one penetration) and consistently testified in her CAC interview and at trial that Whatley was asleep during each incident.
- A juror (Karen Asher) failed initially to disclose a thirty-year‑old, attenuated acquaintance with the victim’s mother; the trial court allowed questioning, denied removal of the juror and denied a mistrial/reset.
- The State relied on the victim’s testimony, the mother’s statements, and circumstantial inferences of intent/voluntariness; defense emphasized the victim’s repeated statements that Whatley was asleep and argued nonvolitional conduct.
- The appellate court addressed (1) whether the juror nondisclosure was material and required mistrial/new trial, and (2) whether evidence was legally sufficient to prove voluntariness and the requisite mens rea (intentionally/knowingly).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (State) | Defendant's Argument (Whatley) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Juror nondisclosure during voir dire | Any prior familiarity was minimal and, after questioning, did not show bias; trial court acted properly in refusing mistrial | Juror failed to reveal material relationship with victim’s mother; nondisclosure impeded ability to challenge juror | No reversible error — nondisclosure not material given 30‑year lapse, minimal contact, juror’s assurances and full questioning allowed |
| Sufficiency — voluntariness (physical act) | Jury may disbelieve parts of victim’s testimony and infer Whatley was awake from cumulative facts and his conduct; multiple incidents support voluntariness | Victim repeatedly said Whatley was asleep; sleep/unconscious touching is nonvolitional so State failed to prove voluntary act and mens rea beyond reasonable doubt | Evidence insufficient — victim’s repeated statements that assaults occurred while Whatley was asleep raised voluntariness issue and State produced no evidence to show he was awake or that sleep could not explain the conduct; conviction reversed and judgment of acquittal entered |
| Sufficiency — intent/knowledge (mens rea) | Intent/knowledge may be inferred from circumstances and conduct | If acts were nonvolitional (sleep/unconscious), intent/knowledge cannot be proven | Not proven — because voluntariness was not established, the required mens rea could not be inferred; State failed its burden |
| Court costs & attorney’s fees | (State) trial court properly taxed costs/fees | (Whatley) challenge to assessment | Not reached — sufficiency ruling disposes; court did not address costs/fees |
Key Cases Cited
- Franklin v. State, 12 S.W.3d 473 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) (juror nondisclosure of witness relationship can implicate right to impartial jury; materiality assessed even if nondisclosure not intentional)
- Franklin v. State, 138 S.W.3d 351 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (recharacterizing error as failure to grant mistrial; withheld information need only tend to show bias)
- Rogers v. State, 105 S.W.3d 630 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003) (definition of “voluntary” under Tex. Penal Code § 6.01(a): excludes movements during unconsciousness or sleep)
- Alford v. State, 866 S.W.2d 619 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993) (when evidence raises accident/nonvoluntariness, State must disprove that defense beyond a reasonable doubt)
- Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (standards for reasonable inferences and sufficiency review)
- Brown v. State, 955 S.W.2d 276 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997) (voluntariness is distinct from mens rea; State must prove voluntary act when issue is raised)