Whary v. Plum Creek Timberlands, L.P., 2014 MT 71

Plaintiffs (successors to the Hudsons) own servient land crossed by a written easement granted in 1972 to Burlington Northern (now Plum Creek) for ingress and egress over a road from Haywire Gulch.
The easement has been used over decades for road inspection, construction, slash burning, timber cruising, logging, and real estate activities.
A segment at the north end was obstructed by Whary (locked gate, boulders, gravel, rock) for a period exceeding five years; Plum Creek personnel first encountered the locked gate in 2009.
Plaintiffs sued (2011) seeking, among other things, extinguishment for non-use and a limitation of the easement to logging-related activities; plaintiffs moved for partial summary judgment to limit use to logging.
The District Court granted Plum Creek’s summary judgment and denied plaintiffs’ partial summary judgment; the Supreme Court reversed and remanded.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the easement terminated for non-use where a segment was obstructed >5 years	The contract’s termination clause (“any segment thereof”) requires giving effect to non-use of a segment — obstruction for >5 years created a factual issue on termination	Overall historical use of the easement defeats a non-use claim; isolated obstructions are irrelevant because Plum Creek used the road at other times	Reversed: court must give effect to “any segment thereof”; material factual dispute exists about obstruction and termination, so summary judgment for Plum Creek was erroneous
Whether the easement’s scope is limited to logging activities	Scope should be limited to historic uses of the dominant tenement (logging and related sporadic activities)	Easement language is general (ingress/egress) and historical/ongoing uses justify broader, non-logging uses	Reversed on this issue as well; scope is a factual question to be decided on remand, and scope analysis should focus on historic use of the dominant estate rather than only the servient estate

Mattson v. Mont. Power Co., 352 Mont. 212, 215 P.3d 675 (easement scope and contract interpretation principles govern)
Guthrie v. Hardy, 305 Mont. 367, 28 P.3d 467 (specific grant language controls; where general, consider reasonable necessity)
Ashby v. Maechling, 356 Mont. 68, 229 P.3d 1210 (scope of implied easement considers actual uses of the dominant estate at severance)
Mason v. Garrison, 299 Mont. 142, 998 P.2d 531 (evaluate easement extent in light of property situation and historical use of dominant estate)
Tungsten Holdings v. Kimberlin, 298 Mont. 176, 994 P.2d 1114 (framework for determining scope of easements based on contemplation at conveyance)