Whaley v. the State
337 Ga. App. 50
| Ga. Ct. App. | 2016Background
- Victim picked up an acquaintance (Chris) who led him behind an elementary school, where Meguel Whaley and Todderius McNorrill confronted him. Whaley brandished a gun, took the victim’s keys, cash, phone, and ID, taped and assaulted the victim, then left in the victim’s car. Victim later identified both men.
- Deputies located the stolen car minutes later; a chase ensued. Whaley jumped from the moving car and fled on foot; McNorrill remained and the car crashed. Both were arrested; show-up identification linked them to the victim.
- Police found a loaded .380 handgun on the driver’s seat and 4.5 grams of marijuana packaged for distribution in plain view on the passenger seat and driver’s floorboard. Twelve .22 caliber bullets were found on McNorrill.
- Whaley was charged (with McNorrill) for hijacking a motor vehicle, possession of marijuana with intent to distribute, possession of a firearm during commission of a crime, and additional offenses including reckless driving and fleeing/eluding. The jury convicted on hijacking, possession with intent, one firearm count, fleeing/eluding, reckless driving (as alleged), learner’s permit violation, and obstruction; acquitted on armed robbery, false imprisonment, and another firearm count.
- Whaley appealed, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence for hijacking, possession with intent to distribute, and reckless driving. The Court of Appeals affirmed the hijacking and possession convictions but reversed the reckless driving conviction (because the State did not prove the specific allegation in the indictment).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (State) | Defendant's Argument (Whaley) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sufficiency of evidence for hijacking a motor vehicle | Keys taken from victim while armed and car later retrieved from lot = vehicle obtained from victim’s presence | Taking keys then retrieving car from lot means car was not taken from the victim’s person or presence | Affirmed — statute requires "presence," not immediate physical presence; jury could find car taken from victim’s presence |
| Sufficiency of evidence for possession of marijuana with intent to distribute | Drugs were in plain view in front passenger area and driver’s floorboard, driver (Whaley) had access, fled from police — supports joint constructive possession and intent | Marijuana could have belonged to victim or McNorrill; State failed to exclude reasonable hypothesis of innocence | Affirmed — totality of circumstances supports joint constructive possession and intent; other hypotheses for possession were excluded for jury to find guilt |
| Sufficiency of evidence for reckless driving (as indicted) | High-speed running of several red lights during pursuit (allegation in indictment) | Evidence showed fleeing/eluding and chase but did not prove running several red lights at high speed as charged | Reversed — State failed to prove the specific manner alleged in the indictment; material averment must be proved as laid |
| Applicability of "presence" concept for hijacking statute | Presence under OCGA §16-5-44.1(b) includes non-immediate presence similar to armed robbery doctrine | Whaley urged a narrower reading requiring immediate physical presence at time of vehicle taking | Court applied precedent (Heard) and construed "presence" broadly; declined to overrule prior case law |
Key Cases Cited
- Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (standard for reviewing sufficiency of evidence)
- Heard v. State, 287 Ga. 554 (presence for robbery/hijacking can extend beyond immediate physical presence)
- McNeal v. State, 326 Ga. App. 429 (definitions of actual and constructive possession)
- Noble v. State, 225 Ga. App. 470 (constructive-possession requires connection beyond mere proximity)
- Maddox v. State, 322 Ga. App. 811 (multiple occupants’ equal access supports joint constructive possession)
- Ford-Calhoun v. State, 327 Ga. App. 835 (indictment averments describing manner must be proved as charged)
- Griffin v. State, 294 Ga. 325 (principle that proof must conform to indictment allegations)