WFG Natl. Title Ins. Co. v. Meehan
107 N.E.3d 60
Ohio Ct. App.2018Background
- Michael P. Meehan, an Ohio attorney, and his title agency Evergreen entered an agency agreement with WFG National Title Insurance Company to issue WFG policies and closing protection letters (CPLs).
- WFG informed Meehan it was terminating the agency effective September 30, 2013; Meehan continued issuing CPLs/policies after that date and retained collected premiums in an IOLTA escrow account instead of remitting them to WFG.
- WFG sued Meehan and Evergreen (claims included breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, theft, civil conspiracy, RICO-like pattern of corrupt activity, negligence, fraud, and for an accounting); default judgment entered against Evergreen for failing to respond.
- Meehan counterclaimed and third-partied various WFG employees and counsel for defamation, conspiracy, tortious interference, and other claims; many counterclaims were dismissed or resolved on motions to dismiss.
- The trial court granted summary judgment for WFG on multiple claims (theft, conspiracy, pattern of corrupt activity, veil-piercing) and granted summary judgment against Meehan on his counterclaims; Meehan’s post-judgment motions (motions to compel discovery, disqualification requests, Civ.R. 60(B)) were denied.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (WFG) | Defendant's Argument (Meehan) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Motion to dismiss: defamation claims based on reports to Ohio Department of Insurance (ODI) and Disciplinary Counsel (ODC) | WFG asserted qualified immunity under R.C. 3905.211 for required insurer reports; statements were privileged | Meehan argued reports were malicious and not privileged; he alleged statements that he "stole escrowed funds" were defamatory | Court: Affirmed dismissal — Meehan failed to plead malice as R.C. 3905.211(B) requires; statements to ODC/ODI protected (qualified immunity and absolute privilege for disciplinary/judicial matters) |
| Motions to compel discovery filed after discovery cutoff | WFG argued discovery deadlines must be enforced; motions were untimely and prejudicial | Meehan argued additional discovery was needed to oppose summary judgment | Court: Denied — trial court did not abuse discretion; Meehan failed to timely seek Civ.R.56(F) relief and showed no substantial prejudice |
| Motion to disqualify opposing counsel (McFadden & Freeburg; Gallagher Sharp) | WFG/counsel maintained no disabling conflict; any testimony by counsel was not shown to be "necessary" and Meehan did not timely pursue discovery to test privilege invocations | Meehan claimed conflicts, that attorneys were necessary witnesses, and alleged privileged communications justified disqualification | Court: Denied — disqualification is drastic; Meehan did not satisfy Dana three-part test or show counsel’s testimony was necessary/unobtainable; no abuse of discretion |
| Withdrawal of admissions (Civ.R.36) | WFG relied on deemed admissions resulting from Meehan’s failure to timely respond | Meehan later provided responses and argued issues of material fact exist | Held: Denied — admissions were conclusively established; Meehan gave no explanation for 112-day delay and court properly refused withdrawal |
| Default judgment against Evergreen; Meehan’s personal liability / veil piercing | WFG sought enforcement against Evergreen and individual liability against Meehan under veil-piercing | Meehan argued his answer should be treated as Evergreen’s and contested personal liability | Court: Default valid as Evergreen did not respond; Meehan lacked standing to challenge default on Evergreen’s behalf; veil-piercing summary judgment affirmed (Meehan admitted controlling Evergreen and using control to commit wrongful acts) |
| Summary judgment on WFG’s claims and Meehan’s counterclaims (including theft, conspiracy, pattern of corrupt activity, fraud/forgery, and veil piercing) | WFG moved showing no genuine issue of material fact; relied in part on admissions and discovery record | Meehan argued multiple genuine factual disputes (termination date, theft, forgery, breach) and that discovery was inadequate | Court: Granted for WFG — many factual disputes were conclusively resolved by admissions; summary judgment proper and veil-piercing established by Meehan’s admissions |
| Civ.R. 60(B) motion for relief from judgment | Meehan sought relief arguing grounds under Civ.R.60(B) and requested an evidentiary hearing | WFG opposed; trial court noted entry was nonfinal at time of motion | Court: Denied — motion improperly sought relief from a nonfinal order; Meehan failed to meet Civ.R.60(B) standards and did not show entitlement to a hearing |
Key Cases Cited
- Jacobs v. Frank, 60 Ohio St.3d 111 (Ohio 1991) (definition of malice in the context of qualified privilege)
- Hecht v. Levin, 66 Ohio St.3d 458 (Ohio 1993) (absolute privilege for statements in judicial proceedings, including attorney-discipline matters)
- M.J. DiCorpo, Inc. v. Sweeney, 69 Ohio St.3d 497 (Ohio 1995) (scope of absolute privilege throughout judicial proceedings)
- Grafton v. Ohio Edison Co., 77 Ohio St.3d 102 (Ohio 1996) (standard of review for summary judgment)
- Dresher v. Burt, 75 Ohio St.3d 280 (Ohio 1996) (burden of moving party on summary judgment)
- Dombroski v. WellPoint, Inc., 119 Ohio St.3d 506 (Ohio 2008) (test for piercing the corporate veil in Ohio)