Wethersfield v. Eser, 211 Conn.App. 537

On May 27, 2019 Wethersfield animal control officer Deborah Monde seized 24 animals from Suzanne Eser’s van after a traffic stop revealed filthy, unhygienic conditions and reasonable belief of imminent harm.
Monde relied on General Statutes § 22-329a(a) to take physical custody without a warrant; the town filed a verified petition under § 22-329a(c) on July 18, 2019 (well after the statute’s 96‑hour guideline).
Eser moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction due to the town’s failure to file within 96 hours; the trial court denied the motion, treating the 96‑hour requirement as directory.
A December 2019 evidentiary hearing resulted in findings that the animals were neglected/cruelly treated, transfer of ownership to the town, and denial of the town’s claim for the $15/day per animal reimbursement because Eser had voluntarily paid kennel costs exceeding that amount.
On appeal Eser sought return of the animals and a hearing for reimbursement of funds she paid; the town moved to dismiss the appeal as moot because animals were later placed in permanent adoptive homes.
The appellate court held the appeal was not moot (practical relief — remand for hearing on reimbursement — remained possible) and resolved the jurisdictional and due process claims against Eser.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Mootness of appeal	Town: appeal moot because animals now deceased or in permanent homes; no practical relief possible	Eser: seeks return of animals and a hearing on reimbursement of funds she paid	Not moot — court could remand for hearing on reimbursement (practical relief exists)
Subject‑matter jurisdiction — 96‑hour filing rule in § 22‑329a(a)	Town: § 22‑329a(a) 96‑hour provision is directory; late filing does not deprive court of jurisdiction	Eser: 96‑hour rule is mandatory; failure to comply deprives court of jurisdiction	Affirmed town — strong presumption in favor of jurisdiction; legislative history and statute do not show clear intent to make the 96‑hour limit jurisdictional; failure to meet it does not divest jurisdiction
Procedural due process — timing of hearing and costs (§ 22‑329a(d), (h))	Town: procedures afforded Eser adequate; she voluntarily paid kennel costs	Eser: delay in filing and in holding hearing deprived her of due process and forced her to pay excessive costs	Denied — claim unpreserved; on Golding review, no constitutional violation shown because Eser voluntarily paid the kennel expenses and Mathews balancing favors the statutory scheme

Williams v. Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities, 257 Conn. 258 (Conn. 2001) (framework for deciding whether statutory time limit is jurisdictional)
Filippi v. Sullivan, 273 Conn. 1 (Conn. 2005) (standard of review for motions to dismiss challenging jurisdiction)
State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233 (Conn. 1989) (four‑part test for appellate review of unpreserved constitutional claims)
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (U.S. 1976) (three‑factor balancing test for required procedural due process)
New Hartford v. Conn. Resources Recovery Authority, 291 Conn. 502 (Conn. 2009) (mootness doctrine and requirement of practical relief on appeal)