Westphal v. City of St. Petersburg/City of St. Petersburg Risk Management
2013 Fla. App. LEXIS 15084
| Fla. Dist. Ct. App. | 2013Background
- Westphal, a firefighter, sustained back and knee injuries and the City accepted compensability.
- Westphal received 104 weeks of temporary total disability benefits and remained totally disabled as those benefits expired.
- A judge of compensation claims denied an award for permanent and total disability (PTD) benefits.
- The case was heard en banc after motions for rehearing; the court receded from its panel’s Westphal-related ruling.
- The court holds that a worker who is totally disabled at the end of temporary benefits is deemed at maximum medical improvement (MMI) by operation of law and may seek PTD benefits.
- The case is remanded for consideration of PTD benefits; the court also discusses statutes and stare decisis in relation to prior decisions.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Is end-of-104-weeks total disability deemed MMI by operation of law? | Westphal: yes, he is at MMI by operation of law and may pursue PTD. | Florida/City: no automatic deeming; must prove MMI or permanent disability. | Yes; end-of-104-weeks total disability is deemed MMI by operation of law, enabling PTD claims. |
| Does the 104-week cap create a lawful gap in disability benefits? | Westphal argues no lawful gap should exist and benefits continue. | Hadley/Oswald implied a gap risk if interpreted to deny PTD. | No unlawful gap; continuous benefits are supported by the statutory framework. |
| Should Hadley be receded (overturned) to interpret §440.15(2) in light of current case? | Westphal seeks recusal of Hadley, favoring Oswald/Hadley line. | Hadley correctly limited PTD eligibility and should not be overruled. | Yes; the court recedes from Hadley and adopts a different interpretation (rule announced by Pa-dovano) for purposes of this case. |
| Does the majority’s approach violate separation of powers by enacting new statutory interpretation? | Dissent argues the majority legislates, violating Art. II, sec. 3, Florida Constitution. | Majority asserts statutory interpretation within judicial powers; no constitutional violation. | Dissenting view: majority’s ruling impermissibly enacts substantive law; note: the majority opinion itself maintains the separation issue is not dispositive. |
Key Cases Cited
- Oswald, City of Pensacola Firefighters v. Oswald, 710 So.2d 95 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998) (established 104-week TTD limit and the Oswald exception for PTD pre-MMI)
- Hadley, Matrix Employee Leasing, Inc. v. Hadley, 78 So.3d 621 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011) (en banc decision revisiting PTD/MMI interpretation; basis for prior rule)
- Thompson v. Florida Industrial Relations Comm’n, 224 So.2d 286 (Fla.1969) (discussion of legislative remedy for gaps in benefits)
- Crum v. Richmond, 46 So.3d 633 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010) (PTD entitlement when not at MMI under Oswald/Hadley framework)
- Rivendell of Ft. Walton v. Petway, 833 So.2d 292 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002) ( PTD/Pre-MMI framework considerations)
- CVS Pharmacy, Inc. v. East, 51 So.3d 516 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010) (PTD/proof requirements before MMI)
- Hadley, Matrix Employee Leasing, Inc. v. Hadley, 78 So.3d 621 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011) (en banc ruling previously interpreting §440.15; cited in dissent)
- East v. CVS Pharmacy, Inc., 51 So.3d 516 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010) (PTD requirements pre-MMl under Oswald framework)