Westley v. State, 254 A.3d 106

Background

Victim (age 12) stayed ~2 weeks with Jessica and Darrelled Westley; Victim later alleged repeated sexual touching by Darrelled during that stay. Brother and other witnesses corroborated observations. Westley was convicted on multiple sex-offense and assault counts.
Before trial, the State moved in limine to exclude evidence that Victim had been sexually abused a year earlier by a different relative (Charles Quails). The parties and motions court initially treated Shand I as limiting Maryland’s rape‑shield statute to willing conduct.
The motions court excluded the prior‑abuse evidence as irrelevant and prejudicial; the court left open possible later admission if the State opened the door.
At trial the State introduced redacted CAC interview excerpts; Westley unsuccessfully sought to admit unredacted material and to cross‑examine about the prior abuse under opening‑the‑door and verbal‑completeness doctrines.
On appeal the Court of Special Appeals held the Rape Shield Statute (§3‑319) covers prior sexual conduct whether willing or not, set a framework for constitutional challenges based on the “sexual innocence inference,” rejected Westley’s opening/verbal‑completeness claims, and affirmed convictions (including that Westley had supervisory responsibility for the child).

Issues

Issue	Westley’s Argument	State’s Argument	Held
1. Does Maryland’s Rape Shield Statute (§3‑319) apply to prior nonconsensual sexual conduct?	Rape‑shield applies only to prior willing sexual conduct (per Shand I); prior abuse therefore admissible.	§3‑319 covers prior "sexual conduct" generally and was intended to protect victims from trauma; applies regardless of consent.	The statute covers prior sexual conduct whether willing or not; Shand II rejects Shand I’s narrower reading.
2. Did exclusion of prior‑abuse evidence violate Westley’s constitutional rights (due process/confrontation) via the "sexual innocence inference"?	Needed to rebut a juror presumption that a 12‑year‑old lacked sexual knowledge and thus could not fabricate; exclusion violated rights.	No presumption of sexual innocence arose on these facts; evidence was irrelevant or outweighed by prejudice; rape‑shield balancing is constitutional.	Court requires a three‑step test (presumption arises; proffer rebuts it; probative value outweighs prejudice). Here no presumption arose; exclusion did not violate constitutional rights.
3. Did the State “open the door” or does the doctrine of verbal completeness require admission of the unredacted CAC interview/prior‑abuse evidence?	State’s questions about prior meetings with CAC and inclusion of brief references in redacted interview invited explanation and thus opened the door.	The references were fleeting, non‑specific, and did not render the prior‑abuse evidence relevant; verbal completeness did not require admitting prejudicial material.	No opening of the door; verbal completeness inapplicable because the unredacted portions were not necessary to explain the redacted statements and would be unfairly prejudicial.
4. Was evidence sufficient to convict Westley under the statutory modality requiring he have temporary care/custody or supervisory responsibility for the minor?	Insufficient proof that Westley accepted supervisory responsibility.	Mother entrusted her children to Jessica Westley and consulted Darrelled; testimony supports implied consent and shared care.	Viewing the evidence favorably to the State, a rational jury could find Westley had implicit responsibility for supervision; conviction sustained.

Key Cases Cited

Shand v. State, 341 Md. 661 (1996) (Court of Appeals rejects narrowing sexual‑conduct definition; treats offer/conduct broadly under rape‑shield)
Shand v. State, 103 Md. App. 465 (1995) (intermediate appellate decision interpreting rape‑shield narrowly; discussed and effectively superseded)
White v. State, 324 Md. 626 (1991) (describes legislative purposes of Maryland’s rape‑shield statute: protect victims and encourage reporting)
Johnson v. State, 332 Md. 456 (1993) (discussion of rape‑shield legislative intent and admissibility limits)
United States v. Dunnigan, 507 U.S. 87 (1993) (constitutional right to testify/due process framework)
Michigan v. Lucas, 500 U.S. 145 (1991) (trial judges’ wide latitude to limit cross‑examination under prejudice/confusion concerns)
State v. Pulizzano, 456 N.W.2d 325 (Wis. 1990) (adopted multi‑factor test for admitting prior sexual‑conduct evidence to rebut a child victim’s alleged sexual innocence)