22 F.4th 828
9th Cir.2022Background
- Environmental groups sued the BLM and Secretary of the Interior challenging 2017–2018 instruction memoranda and over 2,200 oil-and-gas lease sales (alleging NEPA, FLPMA, and APA violations) and sought vacatur of lease sales.
- BLM’s policy shift after 2016 led to large lease sales; Chesapeake purchased seven Wyoming leases (paid >$8.4M) and began development.
- The district court in Phase One held IM 2018-034 unlawful and vacated Phase One lease sales (including two of Chesapeake’s leases), then stayed vacatur pending appeal but limited development (Footnote Six Protocol).
- Chesapeake moved to intervene shortly after the stay (within the appeal period), asserting significant financial and property interests and that existing intervenor WEA would not adequately represent its specific legal defenses.
- The district court denied intervention as untimely and because WEA adequately represented Chesapeake; the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding Chesapeake entitled to intervene as of right under Rule 24(a).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Timeliness of intervention | Chesapeake filed too late; case and Phase One were far advanced so intervention would prejudice plaintiffs | Chesapeake filed within appellate period and only recently learned its leases were implicated; delay excused | Motion to intervene was timely for Phase One appeal and for participation in future phases given discovery date; district court abused discretion |
| Adequacy of WEA’s representation | WEA represents industry generally and can protect Chesapeake’s interests | WEA’s objectives align with Chesapeake; presumption of adequacy | Chesapeake rebutted presumption by identifying colorable arguments WEA did not raise and showing pecuniary/contractual interests WEA may neglect; representation may be inadequate |
| Protectable interest and impairment | (Plaintiffs did not dispute) | Chesapeake argued leases and millions invested give protectable interest that vacatur would impair | Chesapeake has a significantly protectable interest likely to be impaired by disposition — requirement satisfied |
| Necessity under Rule 19 (as raised by district court) | Plaintiffs contended Chesapeake not required because WEA suffices | Chesapeake emphasized direct contract/due-process interests as a leaseholder | Ninth Circuit did not resolve Rule 19 after finding Rule 24(a) satisfied; noted contract-holder principles support intervention as of right |
Key Cases Cited
- Oakland Bulk & Oversized Terminal, LLC v. City of Oakland, 960 F.3d 603 (9th Cir. 2020) (sets Rule 24(a) elements)
- Citizens for Balanced Use v. Mont. Wilderness Ass'n, 647 F.3d 893 (9th Cir. 2011) (broadly construing intervention standards; minimal burden to show inadequacy)
- Smith v. L.A. Unified Sch. Dist., 830 F.3d 843 (9th Cir. 2016) (timeliness analyzed under totality: stage, prejudice, reason/length of delay)
- United States v. Alisal Water Corp., 370 F.3d 915 (9th Cir. 2004) (delay can strongly weigh against intervention)
- United States ex rel. McGough v. Covington Techs. Co., 967 F.2d 1391 (9th Cir. 1992) (post-judgment intervention timely if within appeal period)
- United States v. Washington, 86 F.3d 1499 (9th Cir. 1996) (distinguishes broader intervention when future subproceedings are implicated)
- United States v. Oregon, 839 F.2d 635 (9th Cir. 1988) (existing party may inadequately represent intervenor when it will not make specific arguments)
- Dawavendewa v. Salt River Project Agric. Improvement & Power Dist., 276 F.3d 1150 (9th Cir. 2002) (contract party is necessary in actions seeking to set aside contract)
- Salt River Project Agric. Improvement & Power Dist. v. Lee, 672 F.3d 1176 (9th Cir. 2012) (standard whether present party will undoubtedly make all proposed intervenor's arguments)
