West v. the State
339 Ga. App. 279
| Ga. Ct. App. | 2016Background
- Victim (age 9) testified that in September 2009 West, a family acquaintance, rubbed her genital area over her clothing; she reported it immediately and identified West.
- West was arrested Sept. 17, 2009, requested appointed counsel the same day, and was initially released on bond; he was charged Oct. 29, 2009.
- On Nov. 5, 2009 the parole board revoked West’s parole; he remained confined from Nov. 2009 until trial in June 2013.
- Between Feb. 2011 and June 2013 trial dates were scheduled seven times; the State moved for one continuance (witness unavailable); West repeatedly complained about counsel and sought continuances, filed a pro se speedy-trial demand in Dec. 2010 while represented, and filed a bar complaint in Aug. 2012.
- West was tried in June 2013, convicted of sexual battery, and sentenced to five years. He moved for a new trial claiming a constitutional speedy-trial violation; the trial court denied relief and the Court of Appeals vacated and remanded for additional findings.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sufficiency of the evidence for sexual battery | West contended evidence was insufficient | State relied on victim and corroborating testimony, and West’s admission of touching | Evidence sufficient; child victim testimony alone can sustain conviction (conviction affirmed) |
| Whether 45-month pretrial delay was presumptively prejudicial | West argued 45-month delay triggered Barker-Doggett analysis | State did not dispute length but relied on defendant-attributable delays and parole hold | Delay (45 months) was presumptively prejudicial; court must perform full Barker-Doggett balancing |
| Allocation of responsibility for delay | West claimed delay was attributable to State (e.g., inaction) | State pointed to defendant continuances and counsel-related delays; parole hold caused confinement | Trial court failed to quantify how much delay was attributable to each party; remand required to assess responsibility and reweigh factors |
| Whether defendant timely asserted speedy-trial right and suffered prejudice | West argued his pro se demand and complaints about counsel preserved his right; alleged prejudice from lengthy delay | State argued pro se demand was ineffective while represented and defendant did not timely assert constitutional right; confinement due to parole revocation mitigated prejudice | Court held pro se demand had no legal effect; defendant largely failed to assert constitutional right pretrial (weighs against him). But trial court did not adequately analyze prejudice (complexity of case, impairment of defense, oppressive incarceration), so remand required for detailed findings and balancing |
Key Cases Cited
- Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (standard for sufficiency of the evidence)
- Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (four-factor speedy-trial balancing test)
- Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647 (presumption of prejudice from lengthy delay)
- Weems v. State, 310 Ga. App. 590 (attachments of speedy-trial rights and measurement of delay)
- Vermont v. Brillon, 556 U.S. 81 (inactivity of assigned counsel not chargeable to State)
- State v. Porter, 288 Ga. 524 (need for trial court findings to permit appellate review of Barker analysis)
- Hayes v. State, 298 Ga. App. 338 (consideration of case complexity and weighing of delay in prejudice analysis)