West Philadelphia Achievement Charter Elementary School v. School District of Philadelphia, 132 A.3d 957

Background

Pennsylvania enacted Article VI(F) (the Distress Law) to assist financially distressed school districts; Act 46 (1998, 2001) added special provisions for Philadelphia (a "first class" district) creating a School Reform Commission (SRC) with broad powers, including suspension of School Code provisions.
The Secretary declared the Philadelphia School District distressed in 2001 and the SRC assumed governance; SRC subsequently took actions limiting charter schools (enrollment caps, conditional renewals) by invoking its suspension power.
West Philadelphia Achievement Charter School refused SRC renewal terms, continued operating with >400 students, and sought department funding for excess students; SRC later issued SRC-2013-1 suspending numerous Charter School Law provisions and proposing a Charter Schools Policy.
The Charter School challenged 24 P.S. § 6-696(i)(3) (SRC's suspension authority) as an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power under Article II, §1; this Court accepted original jurisdiction under Act 46 §27.
The Commonwealth parties defended the statute as a permissible delegation (or delegation to suspend under Article I, §12) tied to the Distress Law’s remedial objective; the Court issued a preliminary injunction preserving the status quo and later addressed the non-delegation claim.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether §6-696(i)(3) unlawfully delegates legislative power by letting SRC suspend School Code provisions	Section 6-696(i)(3) gives the SRC unlimited discretion to suspend laws without standards, violating Article II, §1	The power is to suspend (not make law), authorized by Article I, §12; the Distress Law’s remedial objective and statutory framework supply sufficient guidance	Held unconstitutional: §6-696(i)(3) violates the non-delegation rule and is void; SRC actions under it enjoined
Whether the Distress Law provides adequate standards or safeguards to prevent arbitrary suspension	No: legislative objective to end distress is not a sufficiently definite standard or limiting mechanism	Yes: the statute’s purpose, excluded non-suspendable provisions, reporting and removal mechanisms, and overall scheme supply guidance	Court: objective alone insufficient; statute lacks channeling standards, procedures, or judicial-type reasoned-review constraints
Whether the SRC’s suspension power equates to making, altering, or repealing law (i.e., legislative power)	SRC’s broad suspensions effectively rewrite statutory protections and create new rules (e.g., Charter Schools Policy) — de facto legislation	SRC only suspends for remediation during distress, not legislate; suspension power constitutionally distinct	Court: practical effect demonstrated by SRC’s actions supports conclusion that delegation was functionally legislative and uncontrolled
Whether Article I, §12 (power to suspend laws "by the Legislature or by its authority") saves §6-696(i)(3)	Article I, §12 does not eliminate Article II, §1 non-delegation limits; legislative authorization cannot permit abdication of core legislative choices	Suspension by authority can be delegated consistent with Distress Law framework	Court: Article I, §12 does not override non-delegation; §6-696(i)(3) cannot stand merely because it purports to authorize suspension

Key Cases Cited

Locke’s Appeal, 72 Pa. (court approved local-option statute leaving effectiveness to voters) (delegation where law defines policy and leaves fact-finding to others)
Bell Tel. Co. v. Driscoll, 343 Pa. (1941) (legislature may delegate fact-finding; must provide standards)
PAGE v. Commonwealth, 583 Pa. 275 (2005) (invalidating delegation for lack of definite standards guiding agency discretion)
Tosto v. Pa. Nursing Home Loan Agency, 460 Pa. 1 (1975) (upholding delegation where statute included detailed guidelines and procedural safeguards)
William Penn Parking Garage v. City of Pittsburgh, 464 Pa. 168 (1975) (plurality upholding delegation where judicial review and reasoned opinions constrained discretion)
Holgate Bros. Co. v. Bashore, 331 Pa. 255 (1938) (delegation permissible only when surrounded by definite standards, policies, and limitations)
Casino Free Phila. v. Pa. Gaming Control Bd., 594 Pa. 202 (2007) (legislature need not provide every administrative detail; standards must be adequate)
Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935) (federal standard that Congress must supply effective standards; vague policy statements alone are insufficient)
J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394 (1928) (intelligible principle required for delegation)