West Flagler Associates, Ltd. v. Florida Department of Business & Professional Regulation, Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering, 216 So. 3d 692

West Flagler filed an application (Sept. 3, 2015) for a new summer jai alai permit under § 550.0745(1) based on the 2011–2012 and 2012–2013 fiscal years after an eligible permittee declined to convert its permit.
Section 550.0745(1) contains two sentences: (1) establishes conversion eligibility for a permittee whose mutual play for the "2 consecutive years next prior" to filing was the smallest in the county; (2) provides that if an eligible permittee declines to convert, "a new permit is hereby made available" in that county.
The Division denied West Flagler’s application, reasoning the "2 consecutive years next prior" timing requirement applied to the new-permit vacancy created when a permittee declines conversion, and that the years West Flagler relied on were not the two years "next prior" to its 2015 application.
West Flagler sought an informal administrative hearing, arguing the "next prior" timing language applies only to conversion applicants (first sentence), not to the separate "new permit" opportunity (second sentence).
The hearing officer and the Division agreed with the Division’s broader reading and denied the application; West Flagler appealed the Division’s Final Order to the district court.
The First DCA reversed: it held the statute creates two distinct avenues (conversion and creation of a new permit) and the timing phrase "2 consecutive years next prior" applies only to the conversion eligibility sentence, not to the separate new-permit sentence.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the "2 consecutive years next prior" timing requirement applies to applications for a "new permit" made available when an eligible permittee declines to convert	West Flagler: the timing phrase applies only to conversion applicants (first sentence); the second sentence creates a new permit without that timing limitation	Division: the "next prior" language governs both conversion and the subsequent new-permit availability; thus West Flagler’s years were not the two "next prior" years	The court held the timing requirement applies only to conversion applications; the Division improperly imposed it on the separate new-permit opportunity, so reversal was required
Whether the Division’s interpretation—entitled to deference—must be upheld despite conflicting with the statute’s plain meaning	West Flagler: agency deference yields to plain statutory meaning; the Division’s conflation is inconsistent with the statute’s text	Division: its construction should be given substantial weight as the administering agency	The court acknowledged agency deference but concluded the Division’s interpretation was contrary to the statute’s plain language and thus not entitled to deference; reversal followed

W. Flagler Assocs., Ltd. v. Dep’t of Bus. & Prof’l Regulation, Div. of Pari-Mutuel Wagering, 139 So. 3d 419 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014) (prior appellate discussion of summer jai alai permit issues)
Shell Harbor Grp., Inc. v. Dep’t of Bus. Regulation, Div. of Alcoholic Beverages & Tobacco, 487 So. 2d 1141 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986) (agency construction is entitled to great weight)
PAC for Equality v. Dep’t of State, Fla. Elections Comm’n, 542 So. 2d 459 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989) (agency view not followed when contrary to statute’s plain meaning)
S. Fla. Racing Ass’n v. State, Dep’t of Bus. & Prof’l Regulation, Div. of Pari-Mutuel Wagering, 201 So. 3d 57 (Fla. 3d DCA 2015) (context: eligible permittee declined to convert, producing vacancy)