Wesly v. The National Hemophilia Foundation
77 N.E.3d 746
Ill. App. Ct.2017Background
- Dr. Osvaldo H. Wesly sued Georgetown University and others for defamation arising from statements to the National Hemophilia Foundation (NHF) challenging Wesly’s credentials after he received NHF’s 2014 physician-of-the-year award. NHF also emailed members and posted a notice online.
- Count I alleged Georgetown was liable under respondeat superior because Dr. Craig Kessler, an unpaid Georgetown faculty member, made or caused the statements as Georgetown’s agent.
- Georgetown moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction under Illinois’s long-arm statute (735 ILCS 5/2-209) and submitted affidavits: Georgetown has no Illinois campus/office, is not registered in Illinois, and Kessler’s NHF volunteer work was independent of his unpaid Georgetown appointment.
- Wesly opposed with a sworn affidavit about his alleged injuries (job termination) and numerous unverified exhibits showing Georgetown recruits Illinois students, solicits Illinois alumni/funds, holds alumni/recruiting events in Illinois, and that Kessler publicly used his Georgetown affiliation when speaking.
- The trial court denied Georgetown’s motion without findings; the appellate court reviewed de novo and considered whether general or specific jurisdiction under the long-arm statute (and related due-process limits) existed.
Issues
| Issue | Wesly’s Argument | Georgetown’s Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Illinois has general jurisdiction over Georgetown ("doing business") | Georgetown’s recruitment, alumni/fundraising and frequent events in Illinois amount to continuous, systematic contacts making it "at home." | Georgetown’s contacts are typical, sporadic university contacts; it has no Illinois offices or principal place here, so no general jurisdiction. | No general jurisdiction; contacts not sufficiently continuous/systematic to make Georgetown "at home." |
| Whether Illinois has specific jurisdiction under §2-209(a)(2) (tort in state) via respondeat superior/agency | Kessler purposefully directed defamatory conduct at an Illinois resident; his identification with Georgetown and use of a Georgetown email link his acts to the university so the tort arises from Illinois-directed activities. | Kessler’s NHF volunteer work was separate and independent from his unpaid Georgetown appointment; Georgetown did not direct or control his conduct, so no agency for specific jurisdiction. | No specific jurisdiction; plaintiff failed to rebut Georgetown’s affidavits showing Kessler was not acting as Georgetown’s agent when communicating with NHF. |
| Whether plaintiff met prima facie burden to defeat a section 2-301 jurisdictional dismissal | Plaintiff’s affidavit plus exhibits show ties and apparent authority sufficient to overcome Georgetown’s challenge. | Once Georgetown produced uncontradicted affidavits negating agency, plaintiff had to produce counteraffidavit/evidence specifying Georgetown’s control or manifestations of authority. | Plaintiff failed to produce counteraffidavit/evidence creating a genuine dispute on agency; defendant’s affidavits accepted as true. |
| Whether court needed to reach due process analysis | Specific/general jurisdiction shown, so due process satisfied. | Because plaintiff has not established statutory bases for jurisdiction, due-process analysis is unnecessary. | Court did not reach due-process questions after finding no prima facie statutory basis for jurisdiction. |
Key Cases Cited
- Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. (2014) (general jurisdiction limited to place of incorporation or principal place of business except in exceptional cases)
- Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. (2014) (specific jurisdiction requires defendant’s own forum-directed conduct creating the connection)
- Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985) (purposeful direction/availment framework for specific jurisdiction)
- Bagent v. Blessing Care Corp., 224 Ill. 2d 154 (2007) (use of Restatement (Second) of Agency to determine scope of employment)
- Woods v. Cole, 181 Ill. 2d 512 (1998) (principal may be liable for agent’s torts when committed within scope of employment)