Wesley Rattray, Marco Nunez, Martha Saavedra, Antonio Vindell, Carmen Pashos, Steve Tullos, Cesario Pedraza, Minerva Pedraza, Roger Luly, Nora Gonzalez, and Rosalinda Castillo v. City of Brownsville, Texas, 662 S.W.3d 860

Eleven homeowners in Quail Hollow, Brownsville, sued the City after a severe August 2015 rainstorm flooded their homes when the nearby Resaca de la Guerra overflowed.
The North Laredo Gate (motor-driven actuators) is immediately downstream of Quail Hollow and is used to control resaca waterflow; City employee Figueroa closed the gate during the storm.
After closure, the resaca experienced negative flow, water built up, spilled over Laredo Road, and about two feet of water entered homes.
Homeowners sued under the Texas Tort Claims Act §101.021(1)(A), alleging property damage “arose from the operation or use” of motor-driven equipment (the gate).
Trial court denied the City’s plea to the jurisdiction; the court of appeals reversed, finding the complaint alleged nonuse (failure to open) and insufficient causation.
The Texas Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals, holding the pleadings and evidence sufficiently invoke the §101.021(1)(A) waiver at this stage and remanded for further proceedings.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether closing the North Laredo Gate constitutes "operation or use" of motor-driven equipment under §101.021(1)(A)	Homeowners: closing the gate put the motor-driven equipment to its intended use (blocking/controlling water) and directly preceded the flooding.	City: plaintiffs really complain about nonuse — failure to open the gate later — which is not covered.	Yes — at this stage, closing the gate is part of the operation/use of motor-driven equipment; the use/nonuse distinction does not defeat the waiver here.
Whether the property damage "arose from" the gate's operation — i.e., satisfies the statute's nexus/proximate-cause requirement	Homeowners: closure trapped water and was a substantial factor in causing the overflow and flooding; expert and City testimony supports that closure caused buildup.	City: the rainstorm was the sole or inevitable cause; flooding would have occurred regardless of gate closure, so no proximate causation.	A fact issue exists; the court applies proximate-cause standard (cause-in-fact + foreseeability) and concludes plaintiffs have presented sufficient evidence at this stage to avoid dismissal; remand for further proceedings.

LeLeaux v. Hamshire-Fannett Indep. Sch. Dist., 835 S.W.2d 49 (Tex. 1992) (distinguishes "operation or use" from nonuse and limits §101.021 waiver).
Mount Pleasant Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Estate of Lindburg, 766 S.W.2d 208 (Tex. 1989) (definitions of "use" and "operation" under the Act).
PHI, Inc. v. Texas Juvenile Justice Dep’t, 593 S.W.3d 296 (Tex. 2019) (temporal proximity and that certain acts integral to vehicle use can invoke waiver).
Ryder Integrated Logistics, Inc. v. Fayette County, 453 S.W.3d 922 (Tex. 2015) (application of proximate-cause standard to §101.021 claims; active operation not always required).
Texas Natural Resource Conservation Comm’n v. White, 46 S.W.3d 864 (Tex. 2001) (rejects equating "use" with "failure to use" for waiver purposes).
City of San Antonio v. Riojas, 640 S.W.3d 534 (Tex. 2022) (clarifies relationship between §101.021(1)(A) "arises from" and proximate-cause requirements).
Texas Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217 (Tex. 2004) (disputed jurisdictional facts that implicate merits may require resolution by the factfinder).