Wesley Purkey v. United States
964 F.3d 603
| 7th Cir. | 2020Background
- Wesley Purkey kidnapped, raped, dismembered, and killed 16-year-old Jennifer Long in 1998, and committed another murder the same year; he was tried federally, convicted, and sentenced to death in 2003.
- Trial counsel presented mitigation evidence but, according to later counsel, performed a constitutionally inadequate mitigation investigation; the jury returned a death sentence and left mitigation findings blank on the verdict form.
- Purkey filed a §2255 motion raising ineffective-assistance and other claims; the district court denied relief, the Eighth Circuit affirmed on some issues, and the Supreme Court denied certiorari.
- Facing a newly scheduled federal execution, Purkey filed a §2241 habeas petition asserting additional ineffective-assistance claims (including failure to identify a biased juror and failures in mitigation investigation), arguing §2255 was inadequate under the §2255(e) “safety valve.”
- The Seventh Circuit considered whether §2255(e) permits a §2241 petition where prior §2255 counsel (or trial counsel) was ineffective, concluded Purkey did not meet the narrow safety-valve standard, and affirmed the district court; the court nevertheless temporarily stayed Purkey’s execution pending completion of proceedings.
Issues
| Issue | Purkey's Argument | Government's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Availability of §2241 via §2255(e) (safety valve) for new ineffective-assistance claims | §2255 was inadequate because post-conviction counsel and trial counsel were ineffective; Martinez/Trevino and Ramirez support relief | Statutory scheme bars successive §2255 claims; ineffective prior collateral counsel does not render §2255 structurally inadequate | Denied — safety valve requires more than mere unsuccessful prior advocacy; Purkey did not show §2255 was inadequate in practice |
| Juror bias (Juror 13 disclosed attempted rape at 16) | Trial counsel missed obvious bias; this deprived Purkey of a fair jury | Claim was known or discoverable earlier and could have been raised in §2255; permitting §2241 would open endless re-litigation | Denied — claim could and should have been raised in §2255; safety valve not satisfied |
| Inadequate mitigation investigation by trial counsel | New, extensive mitigation evidence uncovered by current counsel could have changed the sentence | Much of the new evidence is cumulative of what was presented; §2255 provided opportunity to raise it | Denied — not enough to show §2255 was structurally unavailable or ineffective to test sentence legality |
| Use of suppression-hearing statements to impeach and prove coercion; counsel’s advice to maintain confession | Counsel misadvised Purkey and failed to object to impeachment/prosecutorial use, amounting to ineffective assistance | The impeachment use was apparent on the record and could have been raised earlier; prejudice is doubtful given evidence | Denied — issue was available in prior proceedings and does not make §2255 inadequate |
Key Cases Cited
- In re Davenport, 147 F.3d 605 (7th Cir. 1998) (safety-valve relief where intervening Supreme Court decision made the conduct noncriminal and §2255 could not remedy)
- Garza v. Lappin, 253 F.3d 918 (7th Cir. 2001) (safety-valve relief where international process produced rights that could not have been presented earlier)
- Webster v. Daniels, 784 F.3d 1123 (7th Cir. 2015) (en banc) (safety-valve relief where newly discovered Social Security records made §2255 unavailable to test Atkins-type claim)
- Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1 (2012) (procedural-default exception for ineffective post-conviction counsel in state habeas context)
- Trevino v. Thaler, 569 U.S. 413 (2013) (extension of Martinez to certain state-court systems)
- Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991) (no constitutional right to counsel in collateral proceedings generally)
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (standard for ineffective-assistance-of-counsel: deficient performance and prejudice)
- Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418 (2009) (stay-of-removal factors applicable to stays generally)
- Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137 (1995) (statutory interpretation that triggered Davenport’s relief)
- Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986) (Eighth Amendment forbids execution of the insane)
- Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (categorical Eighth Amendment bar on executing intellectually disabled persons)