Wesley Patterson v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co.
2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 3813
| 8th Cir. | 2014Background
- Wesley Patterson, a student cheerleader at Prairie View A&M, attended a Gymnastics II class taught by the cheer coach, Jim Price, to practice tumbling; he was not initially enrolled but later did enroll.
- During a graded skills exam in Gymnastics II, Patterson attempted a tumbling sequence, fell, and suffered a catastrophic spinal cord injury.
- Mutual of Omaha issued a Catastrophic Injury Blanket Insurance Policy to NCAA member schools that covers student cheerleaders injured during certain "Covered Events," including "practice sessions" authorized, organized, and directly supervised by a safety-certified coach and in preparation for a Qualifying Intercollegiate Sport team competition.
- District court granted summary judgment to Patterson, concluding Gymnastics II qualified as a covered "practice session;" Mutual appealed the definition and scope of "practice session."
- The Eighth Circuit reviewed de novo, applying Indiana contract law and ordinary-policyholder interpretation rules, and analyzed four coverage requirements derived from the Policy.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Gymnastics II is a "practice session" under the Policy | Gymnastics II was a meeting devoted to systematic exercise for cheerleading proficiency; an ordinary policyholder would view it as practice | "Practice session" should exclude curricular classes and require features like mandatory attendance, tryouts, identical skills, or noncredit status | Held: Gymnastics II can be a "practice session"; dictionary meaning and factual overlap with cheer practice support coverage |
| Whether the session was authorized/organized/supervised by the coach | Price directed instruction, tailored class to skills used in cheer, allowed non-enrolled cheerleaders to attend, and effectively turned class into cheer practice | Price lacked authority to determine course offering/schedule, so he could not "authorize" the session in the Policy sense | Held: Price authorized the cheerleading activities within the class (authorization need not include institution-level curricular decisions) |
| Whether activities were "in preparation for a Qualifying Intercollegiate Sport team competition" | Tumbling practiced in class was the same skill used at football/basketball games; need not tie practice to a specific future game | Because routine was performed for a grade and part of a class, it was not practice "in preparation" for competitions | Held: Sufficiently in preparation — no requirement to identify a particular future game; practicing tumbling during season satisfies this element |
| Whether activities were "directly associated" with a Qualifying Intercollegiate Sport team | The tumbling practiced was used during games and thus directly associated | The class context and grading distinguish it from activities "directly associated" with team competitions | Held: Requirement satisfied — the activity was directly associated with qualifying team competitions |
Key Cases Cited
- Land O’ Lakes, Inc. v. Empl’rs Ins. Co. of Wausau, 728 F.3d 822 (8th Cir. 2013) (standard of review for insurance contract interpretation on appeal)
- Bradshaw v. Chandler, 916 N.E.2d 163 (Ind. 2009) (use plain-meaning and ordinary-policyholder perspective in interpreting insurance terms)
- Allgood v. Meridian Sec. Ins. Co., 836 N.E.2d 243 (Ind. 2005) (clarifies interpretation and ambiguity principles in insurance contracts)
- Town of Orland v. Nat’l Fire & Cas. Co., 726 N.E.2d 364 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000) (insurance policy interpretation generally a question of law)
- City of Lawrenceburg v. Milestone Contractors, L.P., 809 N.E.2d 879 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (ambiguity can be resolved as a matter of law where no factual determination is needed)
- USA Life One Ins. Co. of Ind. v. Nuckolls, 682 N.E.2d 534 (Ind. 1997) (courts may consult dictionary definitions to ascertain ordinary meanings)
- Doe v. Duncanville Indep. Sch. Dist., 70 F.3d 402 (5th Cir. 1995) (recognizes overlap between curricular physical education and athletic practice)
- Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 531 U.S. 288 (2001) (school policies may allow extracurriculars to satisfy curricular requirements)
