Wesby v. District of Columbia
816 F.3d 96
D.C. Cir.2016Background
- Late-night party at a sparsely furnished, apparently vacant D.C. house with ~21 people, strippers, and marijuana; occupants gave conflicting accounts of why they were there and who invited them.
- Officers contacted a woman called “Peaches,” whom several guests said invited them; Peaches ultimately told officers she lacked authority to use the house and refused to come to the scene.
- The property owner told officers no one (including Peaches) had permission to use the house; officers spent ~two hours investigating before arresting the guests for unlawful entry (trespass).
- Prosecutors later dropped charges; plaintiffs sued officers and D.C. under §1983 and D.C. law for false arrest; district court granted plaintiffs summary judgment and a jury awarded damages, later affirmed by a panel.
- The panel denied rehearing en banc; concurrence emphasized agreement on legal standards and disagreement only on facts; Kavanaugh’s dissent argued officers were entitled to qualified immunity.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether officers had probable cause to arrest for unlawful entry | Plaintiffs: no probable cause because mens rea element (knowing or should have known entry was against owner’s will) was unresolved and officers ignored invitees’ bona fide belief | Defendants: probable cause existed or was at least arguable because owner denied permission and facts (vacant house, conflicting stories, Peaches’ evasiveness) supported reasonable disbelief of invitees | Panel: no probable cause; concurrence: facts do not support even an arguable probable cause; dissent: officers reasonably could believe probable cause existed and thus entitled to qualified immunity |
| Whether officers are required to credit suspects’ claims of permission | Plaintiffs: officers must consider suspects’ claim if defense is plainly apparent; an invitee’s bona fide belief negates mens rea | Defendants: officers may disbelieve suspects based on surrounding facts and need not accept explanations on the spot | Held: officers need not credit suspects when record gives reason to doubt; here, panel found record lacked such contradictory evidence and officers wrongly treated invitees’ mindset as irrelevant |
| Whether officers are entitled to qualified immunity despite error | Plaintiffs: officers not entitled because mistake was unreasonable given law clearly required mens rea consideration | Defendants: even if mistaken, officers reasonably could have believed they had probable cause or law was not clearly established | Held: panel denied qualified immunity (fact-specific); dissent argued qualified immunity should apply because ruling created new rule and officers were not plainly incompetent |
| Whether the law was clearly established at the time regarding mens rea for unlawful entry | Plaintiffs: law was clearly established that unlawful entry requires knowledge or that one should have known entry was unwanted | Defendants: panel invented a new rule requiring officers to accept invitees’ claims; officers lacked fair notice | Held: panel and concurrence held state-of-mind requirement was clearly established in D.C. law; dissent countered that prevailing case law permitted arrest when a reasonable officer could disbelieve invitees |
Key Cases Cited
- Wesby v. District of Columbia, 765 F.3d 13 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (panel decision addressing probable cause and mens rea in unlawful-entry arrests)
- Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224 (1991) (officers who reasonably but mistakenly conclude probable cause exists are entitled to immunity)
- Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731 (2011) (qualified immunity protects officials unless law was clearly established)
- Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146 (2004) (probable cause depends on facts known to arresting officer at the time)
- Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972) (probable cause does not require evidence sufficient for conviction)
- Ortberg v. United States, 81 A.3d 303 (D.C. 2013) (D.C. Court of Appeals articulation of mens rea for unlawful entry)
- Garcia v. Jane & John Does 1-40, 779 F.3d 84 (2d Cir. 2015) (officers need accept suspect’s defense only if facts establishing it are clearly apparent to any reasonable officer)