Wendy Davis v. Rick Perry
781 F.3d 207
| 5th Cir. | 2015Background
- In 2011 Texas enacted a state Senate redistricting plan (Plan S148) that, under the Voting Rights Act then in force, required Section 5 preclearance before use in elections. Plaintiffs sued in San Antonio to block S148 and raise Section 5, Section 2, malapportionment, and constitutional claims.
- The San Antonio three-judge court enjoined use of S148 (Sept. 29, 2011) and, facing imminent 2012 elections, fashioned a court-imposed interim map (first S164, then S172) to be used for 2012; the court repeatedly described that relief as interim and not a merits decision.
- The D.C. court denied Section 5 preclearance (Aug. 28, 2012); Texas appealed to the Supreme Court. The San Antonio court’s interim map was used in the 2012 election; plaintiffs won re-election under it.
- While appeals were pending, the Supreme Court decided Shelby County v. Holder (June 25, 2013), invalidating the Section 4(b) coverage formula and effectively eliminating automatic Section 5 preclearance. Texas then repealed S148 and adopted the court’s interim plan S172, mooting the litigation.
- The San Antonio court entered a final judgment (Sept. 4, 2013) summarizing prior relief, dismissed the remaining Section 2 and constitutional claims as moot, and awarded plaintiffs attorneys’ fees. Texas appealed the fee award.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether plaintiffs are "prevailing parties" entitled to attorneys’ fees under the VRA | Plaintiffs argued the injunctions and court-imposed interim plan materially altered legal relations and directly benefited them, so they prevailed | Texas argued plaintiffs did not prevail because (a) interim relief was not judicial relief on the merits and (b) Shelby County removed the legal basis for Section 5 relief, making Texas the prevailing party | Court held plaintiffs were not prevailing parties; interim, non-merits relief was insufficient to support fees under Buckhannon and Fifth Circuit precedent |
| Whether preliminary/interim relief here satisfies the Dearmore test for prevailing-party status after a defendant moots the case | Plaintiffs argued their preliminary injunction-like relief caused Texas to adopt the interim map and mooted the case, satisfying Dearmore | Texas argued the relief was not an "unambiguous indication of probable success on the merits" as Dearmore requires | Court held plaintiffs failed Dearmore’s second prong because the San Antonio court never made a merits determination (it applied only the Section 5 "not insubstantial" standard) |
| Whether Section 2 and constitutional claims (avoided by the court) support fee award | Plaintiffs argued those claims were substantial and arose from the same facts, so the district court’s remedial relief (and final judgment) supports fees | Texas argued Buckhannon rejects awarding fees for voluntary legislative adoption absent judicial imprimatur on the fee-eligible claims | Court held constitutional avoidance left no judicially-sanctioned merits relief on the fee-eligible claims, so those claims cannot justify fees |
| Whether this court should vacate the district court’s interim orders (injunction and interim map) in light of Shelby County and mootness | Plaintiffs implicitly opposed vacatur | Texas asked for vacatur based on Shelby County and mootness | Court declined to consider vacatur because Texas never sought it below and the request was raised for the first time on appeal; court therefore did not vacate those orders |
Key Cases Cited
- Shelby County v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013) (invalidated §4(b) coverage formula, eliminating automatic §5 preclearance)
- Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep’t of Health & Human Res., 532 U.S. 598 (2001) (fee awards require judicially sanctioned change; rejects catalyst theory)
- Perry v. Perez, 132 S. Ct. 934 (2012) (district courts making interim maps must use enacted plans as a starting point; different standards for §5 and §2/constitutional challenges)
- Dearmore v. Garland, 519 F.3d 517 (5th Cir. 2008) (post-preliminary-injunction fee framework: injunction, unambiguous probable-merits indication, and defendant’s mooting caused by injunction)
- Sole v. Wyner, 551 U.S. 74 (2007) (preliminary relief that is reversed or undone by final decision does not confer prevailing-party status)
- Reynoldsville Casket Co. v. Hyde, 514 U.S. 749 (1995) (a later change in law does not automatically decide outcome where independent legal bases exist)