457 P.3d 1020
Okla.2019Background
- Robert Young, an employee of Oklahoma Roofing & Sheet Metal, fell from a roof on June 27, 2011 and died after being required to unhook a single-line lanyard to pass coworkers; employer had prior OSHA citations related to fall protection.
- Crystal Wells (administrator of Young's estate) sued in district court alleging the employer committed an intentional tort (willful, wanton, deliberate conduct) and sought declaratory relief that the Workers' Compensation Act exclusivity provision was unconstitutional.
- The operative statute then was 85 O.S. § 12 (2001 & Supp. 2010), which: (1) makes workers' compensation the exclusive remedy except for intentional torts; and (2) defines an "intentional tort" as existing only when the employee is injured by the employer's "willful, deliberate, specific intent to cause such injury," and states that proof the employer knew the injury was "substantially certain" shall not constitute an intentional tort.
- District court dismissed Wells’s petition, concluding her allegations met the Parret "substantial certainty" standard but did not meet the § 12 statutory "specific intent" standard; the Court of Civil Appeals reversed, holding § 12 an unconstitutional special law.
- The Oklahoma Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed the district court, holding that both "specific intent" and "substantial certainty" describe intentional torts and that intentional torts (including those meeting the substantial‑certainty test) lie outside the workers' compensation scheme; the COCA decision was vacated and the case remanded.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether an employer's conduct that is "substantially certain" to cause injury qualifies as an "intentional tort" outside workers' compensation | Wells: Employer knew the single-line system would almost certainly cause death; "substantial certainty" suffices to allege an intentional tort and fall outside WC exclusivity | Employer: § 12 (and successors) limits intentional torts to only those showing "willful, deliberate, specific intent to cause injury" and excludes "substantial certainty," keeping such claims within WC | Held: Court holds "specific intent" and "substantial certainty" are nomenclaturally the same for intentional torts; both are outside the workers' compensation system and jurisdiction. |
| Whether the § 12 statutory language (excluding "substantial certainty" from intentional tort) is a constitutional special law or otherwise invalid as applied | Wells: The statute as applied creates an underinclusive/overinclusive scheme and may be unconstitutional if it strips remedies for substantially certain intentional conduct | Employer: Legislature validly defined the scope of intentional torts for WC purposes; it may restrict the intentional‑tort exception by requiring specific intent | Held: Court declines to resolve broader constitutional attack; it holds § 12’s substantive carve‑out (intentional torts are outside WC) governs and remands for proceedings consistent with that conclusion. |
Key Cases Cited
- Parret v. UNICCO Serv. Co., 127 P.3d 572 (Okla. 2005) (recognizes two formulations—desire to cause injury or knowledge that injury is substantially certain—as grounds for an intentional‑tort claim outside WC)
- Adams v. Iten Biscuit Co., 162 P. 938 (Okla. 1917) (historical holding that workers' compensation covers accidental injuries but not willful or intentional employer injuries)
- United States Zinc Co. v. Ross, 208 P. 805 (Okla. 1922) (defines "willful" as premeditation/intentional wrongdoing and confirms intentional injuries excluded from WC)
- Jordan v. Western Farmers Elec. Coop., 290 P.3d 9 (Okla. 2012) (discusses effect of 2010 statutory amendments narrowing intentional‑tort exception)
- Davis v. CMS Continental Natural Gas, Inc., 23 P.3d 288 (Okla. 2001) (recognizes that intent may be inferred where actor knows consequences are substantially certain)