Wells v. Chattanooga Bakery, Inc.
448 S.W.3d 381
Tenn. Ct. App.2014Background
- In the 1970s Chattanooga Bakery, Inc. (CBI) used a black-and-white photograph of a young, unidentified boy and a puppy in a MoonPie brochure; no written contract memorialized modeling rights.
- The ad agency that arranged the shoot placed no limits on CBI’s use of the photo; CBI later scanned and digitally modified the image (adding an RC Cola) and reproduced it on merchandise (tins, blankets, bottleneck ringers, cigar boxes).
- Bradley Wells (plaintiff) later identified himself as the boy in the photo and sued CBI and Dr Pepper/Seven Up (DPSU) under Tennessee’s Personal Rights Protection Act (TPRPA), the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act (TCPA), and for unjust enrichment, accounting, and conversion, alleging unauthorized commercial use of his image/likeness.
- Defendants moved to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, arguing complete preemption by the Copyright Act; the trial court found the state-law claims preempted and dismissed the suit.
- The Tennessee Court of Appeals reviewed de novo whether 17 U.S.C. § 301 preempted Wells’s statutory and common-law claims, focusing on (1) whether the photograph falls within copyright subject matter and (2) whether the state-law rights are equivalent to federal copyright rights.
- The court concluded the photograph and its derivative reproductions are within copyright subject matter and that Wells’s claims were functionally equivalent to exclusive §106 rights (reproduction, derivative works, distribution), therefore preempted.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether federal Copyright Act preempts Wells’s state-law claims | Wells contends his publicity and consumer-protection claims, and common-law claims, protect his noncopyrightable personal identity and are independent of copyright law | CBI/DPSU argue the claims are predicated on use and reproduction of a copyrightable photograph and thus are equivalent to rights under §106 and preempted by §301 | Held: Preempted — the Copyright Act completely preempts the pleaded state claims |
| TPRPA (right of publicity) | Wells asserts commercial value in associating the photograph with him; TPRPA protects use of likeness without consent | Defendants: no identifiable publicity interest; the injury flows from reproduction of the photograph, not use of Wells’s individual identity | Held: Preempted — plaintiff not shown identifiable, commercially valuable likeness; claim equivalent to copyright rights |
| TCPA (consumer-protection / false endorsement) | Wells alleges consumers could be confused into believing he endorsed products bearing the photo | Defendants: no reasonable likelihood of confusion because Wells was not publicly known as the model and nobody associated him with the photograph before suit | Held: Preempted — claim rests on reproduction/distribution of the copyrighted photograph |
| Common-law claims (unjust enrichment, accounting, conversion) | Wells seeks implied compensation/profits and damages for use of his image | Defendants: these claims seek recovery for unauthorized use/reproduction of the photograph and thus assert rights equivalent to §106; Tennessee law does not recognize conversion of intangible property | Held: Preempted — unjust enrichment/accounting are equivalent to copyright rights; conversion claim fails as it targets intangible rights and is preempted |
Key Cases Cited
- Ritchie v. Williams, 395 F.3d 283 (6th Cir.) (explaining Copyright Act’s broad preemptive scope)
- Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58 (U.S. Supreme Court) (complete preemption recharacterizes state-law claims as federal)
- Wrench LLC v. Taco Bell Corp., 256 F.3d 446 (6th Cir.) (distinguishing quasi-contract implied-in-law claims from implied-in-fact for preemption)
- Stromback v. New Line Cinema, 384 F.3d 283 (6th Cir.) (functional equivalency test for §301 preemption)
- Stanford v. Caesars Entm’t, Inc., 430 F. Supp. 2d 749 (W.D. Tenn.) (applying subject-matter and equivalency analysis under §301)
- Leggett v. Duke Energy Corp., 308 S.W.3d 843 (Tenn.) (standard of review for preemption questions)