Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Norris
2017 IL App (3d) 150764
| Ill. App. Ct. | 2017Background
- Dixie Norris took out a $161,500 mortgage (2006) and signed the promissory note; Arthur Norris signed the mortgage but not the note. Payments stopped in January 2008.
- Wells Fargo filed foreclosure actions in 2008, 2010, and 2012. The 2008 action resulted in judgment but was later voluntarily dismissed; the 2010 action alleged breach of the original mortgage and an alleged loan modification and was dismissed without prejudice; the 2012 action is the present suit.
- Dixie later conveyed her interest to Arthur in divorce and was discharged in bankruptcy, so Wells Fargo could not pursue a personal deficiency against her; Arthur never signed the note, limiting deficiency exposure as to him.
- Arthur raised as an affirmative defense that the 2012 suit was barred by the single-refiling rule (735 ILCS 5/13-217), previously referring to res judicata/collateral estoppel; he also challenged procedure around prior summary-judgment hearings.
- The trial court granted summary judgment for Wells Fargo in April 2015, rejecting the single-refiling defense and relying in part on the mortgage reinstatement statute and public-policy considerations; Arthur’s motion to reconsider was denied and sale confirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the 2012 foreclosure was barred by the single-refiling rule (735 ILCS 5/13-217) | The 2010 case was a different cause of action (alleged loan modification/defaults), so 2012 is only a single refiling of 2008 and is permitted | 2012 is the third filing of the same foreclosure and thus barred by the single-refiling rule | Court held 2010 alleged different operative facts; 2012 is only one refiling of 2008, so no violation of §13-217 — summary judgment for Wells Fargo affirmed |
| Whether separate suits on separate defaults were permissible | Each missed installment (or separate default event) gives rise to separate causes of action; the 2010 complaint alleged different defaults and a modification | Once debt was accelerated in 2008, no separate installment claims remain; thus subsequent filings are refilings | Court agreed with plaintiff that the 2010 action raised different operative facts (loan modification and different default period), so it was not a refiling |
| Sufficiency of defendant’s affirmative defense and evidence opposing summary judgment | Wells Fargo: Arthur offered only legal conclusions and no affidavits/facts showing a §13-217 violation | Arthur: his pleadings and filings adequately raised the single-refiling defense | Court concluded defendant failed to avoid summary judgment on any genuine factual dispute about the §13-217 analysis needed; nevertheless the court resolved outcome on the transactional test favoring Wells Fargo |
| Appropriateness of trial court reliance on mortgage reinstatement statute / public policy in denying §13-217 defense on reconsideration | Wells Fargo: mortgage-reinstatement statute contemplates multiple starts/dismissals and supports allowing refiling; public policy favors keeping homeowners in place | Arthur: court improperly raised and relied on statute sua sponte; statute doesn't apply because no reinstatement or cure occurred | Court found the reinstatement statute supports the conclusion (statute is specific to mortgage foreclosures) and affirmed the judgment; it saw no reversible error in the court’s reasoning |
Key Cases Cited
- Adams v. Northern Illinois Gas Co., 211 Ill. 2d 32 (discusses summary judgment standard and de novo review)
- Timberlake v. Illini Hospital, 175 Ill. 2d 159 (interprets single-refiling rule as allowing only one refiling)
- Flesner v. Youngs Development Co., 145 Ill. 2d 252 (same principle limiting multiple refilings)
- River Park, Inc. v. City of Highland Park, 184 Ill. 2d 290 (transactional test for determining whether claims constitute same cause of action)
- Home Insurance Co. v. Cincinnati Insurance Co., 213 Ill. 2d 307 (a trial court’s grant of summary judgment may be affirmed on any basis supported by the record)
- Richter v. Prairie Farms Dairy, Inc., 2016 IL 119518 (purpose of §13-217 and related principles)
- Hudson v. City of Chicago, 228 Ill. 2d 462 (treatment of later amendments to §13-217 and effect of Best decision)