Wellington Condominium Association v. Wellington Cove Condominium Association
68 A.3d 594
| R.I. | 2013Background
- Neighboring Newport condominiums originated from a single parcel owned by a declarant; the declarant reserved rights (including withdrawal) in a recorded condominium declaration.
- In 1992 the successor-declarant withdrew Phases IV and VI (land that became defendants’ parcels); plaintiffs retained the remaining condominium property (including tennis courts).
- Section 14.2 of the original declaration reserved the declarant’s right to withdraw and stated: the declarant “will provide reasonable rights of way over and across the real estate withdrawn necessary to provide adequate access to any amenity located in, by, along or adjacent to Narragansett Bay.”
- A gravel road/right-of-way across the withdrawn parcel had been used historically to access plaintiffs’ tennis courts and Kirwins Fifth Ward Lane; use was blocked by defendants in 2005–06, prompting suit.
- Plaintiffs sought declaratory/injunctive relief claiming (1) an express easement under §14.2, and (2) an implied or prescriptive easement; the trial justice denied relief on express-easement and implied-reservation theories.
- The Supreme Court affirmed rejection of an express easement, vacated the judgment concerning implied easement (reservation), held the claim should be analyzed as an implied grant, and remanded for further fact-finding on an implied easement by grant.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether §14.2 created an express easement across withdrawn land | §14.2’s language grants plaintiffs a right of way to access amenities (tennis courts) along Narragansett Bay | §14.2 only reserved rights related to access to Bay amenities (marina); no express easement for tennis courts | Court: Affirmed for defendants — §14.2 is limited to amenities linked to Narragansett Bay (marina), tennis courts do not qualify |
| Whether plaintiffs have an implied easement by reservation after severance | Plaintiffs argued an implied easement exists based on historical use | Defendants argued plaintiffs retained the dominant estate and therefore must show absolute necessity for an implied reservation | Court: Trial justice applied reservation standard in error; analysis conflated estates — reservation inquiry was improper here |
| Proper framework: implied reservation v. implied grant | Plaintiffs contended any implied protection should be recognized | Defendants maintained reservation standard applies because plaintiffs retained dominant estate | Court: The severance left the declarant holding servient estate for development and plaintiffs holding dominant parcel; therefore claim should be evaluated as an implied easement by grant (apparent, permanent, reasonably necessary) |
| Whether trial record/facts suffice to resolve implied grant claim | Plaintiffs requested remand for findings if necessary | Defendants argued plaintiffs failed to meet heightened proof standard | Court: Vacated portion of judgment on implied easement and remanded for additional fact-finding under implied-grant standards (apparency, permanence, reasonable necessity) |
Key Cases Cited
- Hilley v. Lawrence, 972 A.2d 643 (R.I. 2009) (interpretation of instrument creating an easement; clear, unambiguous terms control)
- Catalano v. Woodward, 617 A.2d 1363 (R.I. 1992) (severance implies grant of continuous and apparent easements used during unity)
- Ondis v. City of Woonsocket ex rel. Treasurer Touzin, 934 A.2d 799 (R.I. 2007) (easement claims require clear and convincing proof)
- Wiesel v. Smira, 142 A. 148 (R.I. 1928) (distinction between implied reservation and implied grant; necessity tests)