Welch v. United States
136 S. Ct. 1257
| SCOTUS | 2016Background
- Gregory Welch pleaded guilty (2010) to being a felon in possession of a firearm and was sentenced under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) to a 15‑year mandatory minimum based on three prior convictions, including a 1996 Florida "strong‑arm" robbery.
- The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the ACCA enhancement based on the ACCA residual clause; Welch’s conviction became final after the Supreme Court denied certiorari in 2013.
- Welch filed a §2255 motion challenging his sentence but did not invoke Johnson (which had not yet been decided); the district court denied relief and the Eleventh Circuit denied a certificate of appealability.
- After this Court decided Johnson v. United States (holding the ACCA residual clause void for vagueness), Welch sought reconsideration and certiorari; the Court granted review to decide whether Johnson announced a substantive rule that is retroactive on collateral review.
- The Supreme Court majority held that Johnson announced a substantive rule (not merely procedural) and therefore is retroactive under Teague, vacating the Eleventh Circuit’s denial of a certificate of appealability and remanding for further proceedings.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Welch) | Defendant's Argument (United States / Eleventh Cir.) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Johnson announced a new rule and, if so, whether it is retroactive on collateral review | Johnson invalidated the ACCA residual clause as void for vagueness; that substantive change should apply retroactively to cases on collateral review | Johnson is not retroactive; or Johnson announces only a procedural rule that should not apply to final convictions | Held: Johnson announced a substantive rule and thus is retroactive on collateral review under Teague (majority) |
| Whether the Eleventh Circuit erred in denying a certificate of appealability absent a Johnson argument in Welch’s district court filings | Welch argued denial was appealable in light of Johnson; reasonable jurists could debate relief once Johnson was announced | The Eleventh Circuit’s denial was proper because Welch did not present a Johnson claim in his §2255 motion and the COA inquiry is limited to claims as litigated below | Held: Because Johnson is retroactive, reasonable jurists could debate Welch’s entitlement to relief; vacated denial of COA and remanded |
| Whether Teague’s substantive/procedural distinction should be determined by the underlying constitutional source of the rule | (Amicus/Welch) Underlying right (void-for-vagueness) is procedural due process, so Johnson is procedural | (Majority) Teague focuses on the function/effect of the new rule (does it alter the scope of punishment?), not the constitutional source | Held: Teague should be applied by examining the function/effect of the rule; Johnson is substantive (alters the class of persons the ACCA punishes) |
| Whether courts of appeals and this Court may consider Johnson‑based relief when the claim was not raised in the district court §2255 motion | Welch contended COA denial should be reconsidered in light of Johnson despite not having raised Johnson in district court | The dissent argued Welch’s failure to raise Johnson below is a procedural/default barrier that should preclude appellate consideration | Held: Majority did not treat Welch’s failure below as an insurmountable bar once Johnson is recognized as a retroactive substantive rule; case remanded for further proceedings (dissent disagrees) |
Key Cases Cited
- Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989) (establishes general nonretroactivity rule and two exceptions: new substantive rules and watershed procedural rules)
- Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348 (2004) (distinguishes substantive rules that alter who or what the law punishes from procedural rules)
- Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. ---- (2015) (decided the ACCA residual clause is void for vagueness) (relied on throughout opinion)
- Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614 (1998) (held statutory‑interpretation rules narrowing criminal statutes can be retroactive)
- Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137 (1995) (statutory construction narrowing the meaning of "use" of a firearm) (discussed re: Bousley)
- Miller‑El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322 (2003) (standards for certificate of appealability; COA screens claims for debatable constitutional questions)
- Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473 (2000) (COA standard: whether reasonable jurists could debate the district court's resolution)
- United States v. United States Coin & Currency, 401 U.S. 715 (1971) (a statute invalid under the Constitution cannot be legitimized by factfinding)
- Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358 (2010) (courts consider limiting constructions before declaring a statute vague)
- Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406 (2007) (distinguishes rules that change procedural allocation of decisionmaking)