Weingarten v. United States
2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 13586
| 2d Cir. | 2017Background
- In 1997 Israel Weingarten, then 16-year-old daughter (Doe) was sexually abused during international travel to the United States and Belgium; Doe reported the abuse to her mother in 1997 but federal indictment came in 2008.
- In 2008 a federal grand jury charged Weingarten under 18 U.S.C. § 2423 (transporting and traveling in foreign commerce to engage in sexual conduct with a minor). He was convicted and ultimately sentenced to 30 years.
- At the pretrial stage Weingarten conceded the indictment was timely under the 2003 amendment to 18 U.S.C. § 3283 (life-of-the-child limitations extension) while arguing due-process and territorial-nexus defenses; counsel did not press a statute-of-limitations challenge.
- On collateral review under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 Weingarten argued trial counsel was ineffective for conceding timeliness and not arguing (1) the 2003 § 3283 amendment should not apply retroactively to 1997 conduct, and (2) § 2423 is not categorically a “child sexual abuse” offense and thus the default five-year limitations period (§ 3282) applied.
- The District Court denied § 2255 relief; the Second Circuit affirmed, holding counsel’s strategic choice to forgo the statute-of-limitations arguments was objectively reasonable given unsettled law and non-obviousness of the claimed errors.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Weingarten) | Defendant's Argument (United States) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the 2003 amendment to 18 U.S.C. § 3283 applies retroactively to 1997 conduct | 2003 § 3283 does not clearly state retroactive effect; counsel should have argued it didn’t apply, barring prosecution | 2003 language ("No statute of limitations that would otherwise preclude prosecution…") supports retroactive application to extend limitations | Counsel reasonably declined this novel/complex retroactivity argument; not ineffective assistance |
| Whether § 3283 or the default § 3282 applies to § 2423 offenses (categorical approach) | § 3283’s phrasing requires a categorical elements-based inquiry; § 2423 is an intent offense and not categorically a child-sex-abuse offense, so § 3282 applies | § 3283 targets offenses that "involve" child abuse and contemplates a conduct-based inquiry; categorical approach is not obviously required | It was not obvious that the categorical approach applied; counsel’s decision not to press this was reasonable |
| Whether counsel must raise every non-frivolous argument (ineffective assistance scope) | Failure to present statute-of-limitations claims was deficient and prejudicial | Strategic selection of strongest issues is permissible; counsel need not present every colorable claim | Court reaffirmed Strickland/Jones: counsel can reasonably prioritize issues; no deficient performance found |
| Whether Weingarten suffered prejudice under Strickland (but-for effect) | Had counsel argued limitations, indictment would have been dismissed and convictions avoided | Given unsettled law, success on those arguments was uncertain; no reasonable probability of a different outcome | No prejudice shown; § 2255 relief denied |
Key Cases Cited
- Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244 (retroactivity framework for statutes)
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (ineffective assistance of counsel standard)
- Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745 (counsel not required to raise every nonfrivolous issue)
- Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (background on categorical approach rationale)
- Stogner v. California, 539 U.S. 607 (limitations and ex post facto concerns)
- Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276 (modern categorical approach discussion)
- United States v. Enterprise Mortgage Acceptance Co. Sec. Litig., 391 F.3d 401 (2d Cir.) (retroactivity and extension of limitations in civil context)
- Vernon v. Cassadaga Valley Cent. Sch. Dist., 49 F.3d 886 (2d Cir.) (statutes of limitations and retroactivity discussion)
- United States v. Leo Sure Chief, 438 F.3d 920 (9th Cir.) (holding 2003 § 3283 applied retroactively to extend live claims)
- Lynch v. Dolce, 789 F.3d 303 (2d Cir.) (Strickland presumption of reasonable strategy)
