950 F. Supp. 2d 811
D. Maryland2013Background
- Weigel sued the State of Maryland and Armistead Homes Corporation for declaratory and injunctive relief; TRO and preliminary injunction motions were filed in Sept–Oct 2012 and an amended class action followed in Oct 2012.
- Armistead is a nonprofit housing coop owning about 1500 properties in Baltimore; membership requires a leasehold, a 99-year term, and monthly payments plus a membership fee and downpayment.
- Armistead’s governing documents allow termination of the Membership Certificate for default after notice and a cure period; eviction can follow if default is not cured.
- Tracey v. Solesky (Tracey) held pit bulls or mixes may impose strict liability on owners/landlords under certain conditions, prompting Armistead to adopt a ban on pit bulls post-Tracey.
- Plaintiffs are Armistead members who own dogs believed to be pit bulls; they challenge Tracey’s application and Armistead’s ban as unlawful, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, including invalidating Tracey and restraining evictions.
- The court granted the State Defendants’ motion to dismiss as to all claims; other motions were denied as moot; standing and ripeness were evaluated along with Eleventh Amendment immunity and other defenses.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether plaintiffs have standing to sue. | Plaintiffs allege concrete, personal harm from Tracey’s application and Armistead’s ban. | Defs argue lack of standing due to state immunity and lack of direct injury. | Plaintiffs have standing at this stage. |
| Whether Tracey’s ruling raises ripe, justiciable takings and due process issues. | Tracey imposes liability and effects property rights; as-applied and facial challenges are ripe. | Tracey does not present a cognizable taking or due process violation; actions are state-police powered. | Ripeness and standing substantial; claims largely dismissed on merits for other reasons. |
| Whether Eleventh Amendment immunity bars claims against state officials. | Ex parte Young exception applies for ongoing federal law violations. | Official-capacity claims against Maryland officials are barred; no proximity to Tracey. | Counts I–IV, VII, VIII barred by Eleventh Amendment immunity. |
| Whether absolute judicial immunity bars claims against Judge Bell. | Judge Bell’s Tracey decision violated rights; immunity should not apply. | Judicial acts within official capacity are immune. | Claims against Judge Bell barred by absolute judicial immunity. |
| Whether the amended complaint states plausible federal takings and due process claims. | Tracey’s rule appropriates property rights without just compensation and violates due process. | Tracey does not constitute a taking; due process standards satisfied by rational basis and state interests. | Takings and related state-law claims fail to state a plausible claim. |
Key Cases Cited
- Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Florida Dept. of Envtl. Protection, 560 U.S. 702 (2010) (judicial takings concerns discussed; plurality opinions debated approach to state court decisions)
- Tracey v. Solesky, 50 A.3d 1075 (Md. 2012) (strict liability for pit bull attacks; breed-specific regulation influences liability)
- Williamson County Reg’l Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172 (U.S. 1985) (ripeness prerequisites for regulatory takings claims)
- Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908) (exception to Eleventh Amendment immunity for ongoing federal-law violations)
- Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528 (2005) (takings inquiry begins with whether government action interfered with property)
- Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992) (property owners’ rights and regulatory restrictions under takings framework)