Weible, R. v. Wells, W.
Weible, R. v. Wells, W. No. 46 WDA 2016
| Pa. Super. Ct. | Feb 27, 2017Background
- William and Elizabeth Wells sought to acquire title to land by adverse possession after occupying and using it against the Commonwealth’s ownership.
- The opinion provided is a dissent (Strassburger, J.) from the Superior Court decision in the Wellses’ appeal.
- The dissent frames adverse possession as an extraordinary remedy that requires strict proof of continuous, hostile possession for the statutory period.
- The dissent relies heavily on Showalter v. Pantaleo, where a property’s inclusion in a bankruptcy estate (custodia legis) interrupted the required continuous 21-year adverse possession period.
- The dissent argues that the Commonwealth’s ownership for public use should similarly interrupt continuity, requiring a new statutory period after state ownership ends.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Wells) | Defendant's Argument (Commonwealth) | Held (dissent) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Does state ownership interrupt the statutory period for adverse possession? | Continuous hostile possession before and after state ownership should count toward the statutory period. | State ownership does not necessarily destroy continuity; earlier possession may be tacked. | State ownership interrupts continuity; a new statutory period must run after state parts with title. |
| Is state ownership analogous to custodia legis (e.g., bankruptcy) for interruption purposes? | Wells: prior possession remains continuous despite public ownership. | Commonwealth: public ownership can defeat or interrupt private claims. | Analogy applies; custody of law in bankruptcy and public/state ownership both interrupt adverse possession. |
| Can possession prior to state ownership be tacked to possession after state ownership? | Tacking is permissible to reach the statutory period. | Tacking should not bridge a period during which title was in the state. | No; tacking across a period of state ownership is not allowed—possession after state ownership alone counts. |
| Is tolling available (e.g., under statutes addressing stays) to preserve an adverse-possession claim while land is held by the state? | Tolling or equitable doctrines should preserve accrued possession time. | Tolling does not apply where legal custody/ownership prevents a legally cognizable adverse-possession claim. | No tolling: when title is in the state, continuity is interrupted and statutory period must start anew. |
Key Cases Cited
- Pennsylvania Servs. Corp. v. Texas E. Transmission, LP, 98 A.3d 624 (Pa. Super. 2014) (characterizing adverse possession as an extraordinary doctrine requiring strict proof)
- Flannery v. Stump, 786 A.2d 255 (Pa. Super. 2001) (recognizing strict requirements for adverse possession)
- Edmondson v. Dolinich, 453 A.2d 611 (Pa. Super. 1982) (observing gravity of depriving ownership by adverse possession and strict proof standards)
- Showalter v. Pantaleo, 9 A.3d 233 (Pa. Super. 2010) (holding property in bankruptcy estate interrupts continuous adverse possession)
- Armstrong v. Morrill, 81 U.S. 120 (1871) (holding state ownership destroys efficacy of prior possession; new adverse period required)
- Greene v. Esquibel, 272 P.2d 330 (N.M. 1954) (holding prescriptive period must run after state parts with title)