Wehrer v. Dynamic Life Therapy & Wellness, 926 N.W.2d 107

Plaintiff Arlys Wehrer sued Dynamic Life Therapy & Wellness after a September 2, 2014 neck massage by licensed massage therapist Nicole Jones, alleging Jones compressed Wehrer’s vagus nerve, causing Wehrer to lose consciousness, fall from a chair, and sustain injuries.
Wehrer filed the negligence suit on February 17, 2017; Dynamic Life moved for summary judgment asserting the claim was time barred under the two-year statute of limitations for professional negligence, Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-222.
The district court granted summary judgment, concluding massage therapists are "professionals" under § 25-222 based on statutory licensure and administrative regulations, so the 2-year limitations period applied and Wehrer’s claim was untimely.
Wehrer argued on appeal that massage therapy is not a "profession" for § 25-222 purposes (so the ordinary negligence statute applies) and alternatively argued § 25-222 is unconstitutional as vague and an improper delegation.
The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed whether massage therapy meets the court’s multi-factor definition of "profession" and whether the district court erred in applying § 25-222.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether a massage therapist is a "professional" under § 25-222	Massage therapy lacks the long, intensive preparation, high achievement/conduct standards, and scholarly foundations required to be a "profession"	Licensure, required 1,000-hour training, continuing education, and regulatory oversight show massage therapy is a profession	Held: Not a "profession" under § 25-222; licensure alone is insufficient
Whether § 25-222's 2-year statute of limitations barred Wehrer’s claim	§ 25-222 does not apply, so general negligence limitations govern (longer)	§ 25-222 applies and Wehrer’s suit (filed ~2.5 years after injury) is time barred	Held: Because massage therapists are not "professionals" for § 25-222, the professional 2-year limit does not apply; summary judgment reversed
Whether the district court properly granted summary judgment	District court erred in classifying massage therapy as a profession and thus erred in granting summary judgment	Summary judgment appropriate because claim untimely under § 25-222	Held: Summary judgment reversed and cause remanded
Whether court needed to resolve Wehrer’s constitutional challenge to § 25-222	Court should reach constitutionality if statute applied	Defendant did not need court to reach constitutionality if statute applied	Held: Court did not address constitutionality because it found § 25-222 inapplicable

Reinke Mfg. Co. v. Hayes, 256 Neb. 442, 590 N.W.2d 380 (1999) (discusses absence of legislative definition of "professional" for § 25-222)
Tylle v. Zoucha, 226 Neb. 476, 412 N.W.2d 438 (1987) (sets forth factors and cautions against relying solely on licensure to define a "profession")
Parks v. Merrill, Lynch, 268 Neb. 499, 684 N.W.2d 543 (2004) (licensed securities agent held not a "professional" under § 25-222)
Churchill v. Columbus Comm. Hosp., 285 Neb. 759, 830 N.W.2d 53 (2013) (physical therapists held to meet the definition of "profession" under § 25-222)
Georgetowne Ltd. Part. v. Geotechnical Servs., 230 Neb. 22, 430 N.W.2d 34 (1988) (engineers and architects treated as professionals under § 25-222)
Bixenmann v. Dickinson Land Surveyors, 294 Neb. 407, 882 N.W.2d 910 (2016) (further discusses application of § 25-222 factors)