Weber, B. v. Weber, M. v. Weber, M.
168 A.3d 266
Pa. Super. Ct.2017Background
- Beth Anne F. Weber (Wife) and Mark D. Weber (Husband) divorced in 2000 after a marital settlement agreement that obligated parents to "share equally the reasonable costs" of appropriate post-secondary education for their children.
- The agreement also contained provisions regarding investments made by the paternal grandfather for the children and consequences if Husband mismanaged those investments.
- In 2007 Wife filed a petition to enforce the education provision; their son (Son) sought to intervene and the court granted him leave to intervene and join as a plaintiff in April 2008. A voluntary non-suit was entered the same day.
- In April 2016 Son filed a petition for special relief to enforce paragraph 18 (education costs). Husband answered denying responsibility and raised defenses; argument was held July 2016.
- On August 8, 2016 the trial court dismissed Son’s petition for lack of standing (raising the issue sua sponte), concluding Son could not invoke the Divorce Code's enforcement mechanisms without Wife participating and that Chen v. Chen limited children’s ability to enforce parents’ agreements.
- The Superior Court vacated and remanded, holding the trial court erred to raise standing sua sponte and that Son—having been permitted to intervene and being an intended third-party beneficiary—may pursue enforcement.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether trial court could raise standing sua sponte | Son: court should not raise standing sua sponte; issue wasn’t litigated | Court: standing defect justified dismissal | Court: raising standing sua sponte was improper (standing is non-jurisdictional) |
| Whether Son has standing to enforce parents’ agreement as intervenor | Son: previously permitted to intervene and is an intended third-party beneficiary; may enforce agreement | Husband: Son lacks standing; non-suit and statute limit enforcement to parties | Court: Son has intervention rights and is an intended third‑party beneficiary; may seek enforcement |
| Whether Son must have Wife’s participation to pursue special-relief under Divorce Code | Son: not required—intervenor/third‑party beneficiary can enforce | Husband/Trial Court: without Wife’s petition Son cannot use Divorce Code remedies | Court: Wife’s absence does not bar Son from enforcing the agreement as intervenor and third‑party beneficiary |
| Whether Chen v. Chen bars Son from enforcing the education provision | Son: Chen distinguishes support-to-custodial-parent from direct benefits like tuition | Husband: Chen prohibits children enforcing parents’ settlement provisions | Court: Chen is distinguishable; Chen forbids enforcement of payments to custodial parent but allows enforcement of provisions that directly benefit children (e.g., college tuition) |
Key Cases Cited
- Johnson v. Johnson, 908 A.2d 290 (Pa. Super. 2006) (standard of review and abuse-of-discretion framework for denial of special relief)
- In re Nomination Petition of deYoung, 903 A.2d 1164 (Pa. 2006) (court may not raise standing sua sponte where standing is non-jurisdictional)
- Guy v. Liederbach, 459 A.2d 744 (Pa. 1983) (two‑part test for third‑party beneficiary status)
- Chen v. Chen, 893 A.2d 87 (Pa. 2006) (children generally may not enforce settlement provisions that provide payments to custodial parent; distinguishes direct benefits to child)
- Miller v. Allstate Ins. Co., 763 A.2d 401 (Pa. Super. 2000) (third‑party beneficiaries have the same contract rights and limitations as original parties)
- Bender v. Bender, 715 A.2d 1199 (Pa. Super. 1998) (cited regarding third‑party beneficiary and enforcement principles)