Webb v. Special Electric Co., Inc.
63 Cal. 4th 167
| Cal. | 2016Background
- Webb worked handling Johns‑Manville Transite pipe (1969–1979); he developed mesothelioma in 2011 and sued multiple defendants, including Special Electric, a broker that arranged sales of crocidolite asbestos to Johns‑Manville.
- Crocidolite is an amphibole asbestos and, per expert testimony, far more toxic than chrysotile; Special Electric never took physical possession of the asbestos and earned a commission as broker.
- Johns‑Manville manufactured Transite pipe using recycled scraps that sometimes contained trace crocidolite; Transite pipe and deliveries often lacked user warnings during the relevant period.
- A jury found Special Electric liable for failure to warn and negligence; trial court later entered JNOV for Special Electric, which the Court of Appeal reversed; the Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeal, holding JNOV was erroneous because substantial evidence supported the jury verdict.
- The legal question addressed: when a supplier of a hazardous raw material can discharge its duty to warn ultimate users by relying on an intermediary (the sophisticated intermediary doctrine) and what factual showing is required to establish that defense.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Scope of supplier's duty to warn downstream users | Supplier must warn end users about known/knowable hazards of raw material that becomes part of finished product | Supplier may rely on a sophisticated purchaser or intermediary to warn downstream users and thus discharge its duty | Supplier has a duty to warn but may discharge it under the sophisticated intermediary doctrine if it (1) warned the intermediary or sold to a purchaser that actually or should be aware of the danger, and (2) reasonably relied on the intermediary to warn others; reasonableness is usually a jury question |
| Adequacy of relying on purchaser's "should know" status without actual warnings | Plaintiff: ‘‘should know’’ is insufficient; supplier must at least warn the intermediary given minimal burden | Defendant: purchaser sophistication alone excuses supplier from warning the intermediary or end users | The Court allows purchaser sophistication to substitute for actual warnings only when the buyer actually knew or should have known of the specific danger; but sophistication alone does not automatically absolve supplier—reasonable reliance must be proven |
| Burden of proof and nature of the defense | Plaintiffs: supplier bears duty; proof of direct failure to warn supports liability | Defendant: sophisticated intermediary is an affirmative defense and supplier must prove it was satisfied | Court: sophisticated intermediary is an affirmative defense; supplier bears burden to prove it warned or that the intermediary actually or should have known and that supplier reasonably relied on intermediary to warn downstream users |
| Standard of review for JNOV on failure to warn | Plaintiffs: jury verdict supported by substantial evidence—JNOV improper | Defendant: evidence established as matter of law that supplier could rely on Johns‑Manville | Held JNOV improper: viewed in plaintiffs’ favor, substantial evidence supported the jury verdict; factual disputes (warnings, knowledge of crocidolite, actual reliance) made reasonableness a jury issue |
Key Cases Cited
- Johnson v. American Standard, Inc., 43 Cal.4th 56 (recognizing sophisticated user defense; objective "should know" standard)
- Anderson v. Owens‑Corning Fiberglas Corp., 53 Cal.3d 987 (failure‑to‑warn principles; known-or‑knowable standard)
- O’Neil v. Crane Co., 53 Cal.4th 335 (component parts doctrine limits supplier liability for finished‑product design)
- Barker v. Lull Engineering Co., 20 Cal.3d 413 (design defect tests cited for defect taxonomy)
- Brown v. Superior Court, 44 Cal.3d 1049 (warning‑defect discussion; duty to warn explained)
- Artiglio v. General Electric Co., 61 Cal.App.4th 830 (bulk supplier rule; factors for raw‑material supplier liability)
- Persons v. Salomon N. Am., Inc., 217 Cal.App.3d 168 (application of Restatement §388 comment n; manufacturer may rely on rental intermediary when direct warnings are infeasible)