Weaver v. Weaver
308 Neb. 373
| Neb. | 2021Background
- A 2016 District of Columbia divorce decree, later registered in Nebraska, incorporated a settlement agreement giving Meaghann sole physical custody and Glen limited parenting time (every other weekend and a biweekly dinnertime), with occasional daycare visits for Glen subject to conditions.
- Paragraph 4.2 of the agreement required the parties to mediate/moderate requests for modification "upon a material and significant change in circumstance," and paragraph 4.4 provided that if dispute resolution failed, a court should apply the "then-governing legal standard" to modification petitions.
- Glen (father) filed to modify parenting time, alleging material changes: relocation to Omaha, changes in work/deployment and health, increased availability, and Meaghann’s denial of daycare visitation and unilateral decisionmaking on childcare.
- The district court found additional parenting time would be in the child’s best interests but denied modification because Glen failed to prove a material change in circumstances.
- The Nebraska Court of Appeals reversed, concluding the parties’ agreement allowed modification based solely on the child’s best interests; the Nebraska Supreme Court granted further review.
- On further review the Nebraska Supreme Court held that the agreement did not eliminate the judicial threshold requirement of a material change, but on the merits found the combined facts did constitute a material change and remanded for reconsideration consistent with the child’s best interests.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Glen) | Defendant's Argument (Meaghann) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the agreement’s "then-governing legal standard" clause permits court modification based solely on best interests (no material-change threshold) | Agreement permits courts to modify custody based solely on the child’s best interests | Clause governs only party dispute-resolution obligations; it does not displace the statutory/common-law material-change threshold | Court: Clause does not eliminate the material-change requirement; it governs mediation and leaves courts to apply the prevailing legal standard (which requires material change) |
| Whether Nebraska law requires proof of a material change before judicial modification | Parenting Act and best-interests focus allow direct modification without material-change showing | Precedent requires a two-step test: material change first, then best interests | Court reaffirmed the two-step rule: showing a material change is required, then show modification is in the child’s best interests |
| Whether Glen proved a material change of circumstances since the decree | Denial of daycare visits plus changes in employment/availability and health-related deployment limits together are material | These circumstances were contemplated by the parties or not established | Court (de novo): Combined facts—unwillingness to permit daycare visits and Glen’s changed employment/health availability—constitute a material change |
| Whether the district court abused its discretion by denying modification despite finding increased visitation would be in the child’s best interests | Trial court should have proceeded to modify custody given material change and best-interests finding | Trial court did not err in weighing evidence | Court: District court abused its discretion in concluding no material change; remanded for modification consistent with best interests |
Key Cases Cited
- Bayne v. Bayne, 302 Neb. 858, 925 N.W.2d 687 (full faith and credit and interpretation of foreign custody decrees)
- Eric H. v. Ashley H., 302 Neb. 786, 925 N.W.2d 81 (two-step test for custody modification: material change then best interests)
- Hall v. Hall, 238 Neb. 686, 472 N.W.2d 217 (definition and treatment of material change in circumstances)
- Grange v. Grange, 15 Neb. App. 297, 725 N.W.2d 853 (aggregating multiple post-decree changes to find material change)
- Hibbard v. Hibbard, 230 Neb. 364, 431 N.W.2d 637 (one parent’s denial of another’s visitation can be a material change)
- Rauch v. Rauch, 256 Neb. 257, 590 N.W.2d 170 (standard for appellate de novo review in equity actions)