Weatherford v. City of San Rafael
218 Cal. Rptr. 3d 394
| Cal. | 2017Background
- Plaintiff Cherrity Weatherford, a San Rafael/Marin County resident and renter, sued San Rafael and Marin County under Code of Civil Procedure § 526a challenging vehicle-impound practices; she alleged payment of sales, gasoline, water/sewer taxes/fees but not property tax.
- Section 526a authorizes suits to enjoin illegal or wasteful expenditures by local governments brought by a resident citizen or a corporation “who is assessed for and is liable to pay, or, within one year … has paid, a tax therein.”
- At trial the parties stipulated to dismissal based on Court of Appeal precedents read to require payment of property tax for individual standing; Weatherford appealed that stipulated judgment.
- The Court of Appeal affirmed, holding an individual must be liable for or have paid a property tax in the relevant locality to invoke § 526a.
- The California Supreme Court granted review to decide whether § 526a requires payment (or liability for payment) of property tax and, if not, what taxes suffice; the case was remanded for factual development about which taxes were actually paid or imposed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether § 526a requires payment of property tax for individual standing | Weatherford: § 526a does not require property-tax payment; other assessed taxes suffice | City/County: individual plaintiffs must have paid or be liable for property tax in the locality | Court: No — property-tax payment is not required; statute is broader |
| What taxes satisfy the statute and meaning of “therein” | Weatherford: any tax paid while resident in the locality qualifies (geographic reading) | Defendants: tax must be assessed by and paid into the defendant locality (fiscal/direct assessment reading) | Court: plaintiffs must allege they paid or are liable for a tax assessed on them by the defendant locality; remand for factual development |
| Proper interpretive approach to § 526a standing | Weatherford: broad remedial purpose supports liberal construction | Defendants: textual limitations support narrower reading tied to property taxes or direct assessments | Court: interpret statute in light of text, context, remedial purpose; disallow property-tax-only requirement but permit a direct-assessment allegation standard |
| Whether standing analysis raises constitutional/equal protection issues | Weatherford: property-tax-only rule would raise equal protection concerns | Defendants: rely on precedent upholding limitations | Court: declined to reach equal protection issue because property-tax requirement rejected on statutory grounds |
Key Cases Cited
- Blair v. Pitchess, 5 Cal.3d 258 (1971) (describes § 526a’s primary purpose to enable broad taxpayer challenges to governmental expenditures)
- Irwin v. City of Manhattan Beach, 65 Cal.2d 13 (1966) (discusses § 526a’s residency requirement and limits on taxpayer standing)
- Van Atta v. Scott, 27 Cal.3d 424 (1980) (addresses liberal construction of § 526a in light of remedial purpose)
- Torres v. City of Yorba Linda, 13 Cal.App.4th 1035 (1993) (Court of Appeal decision previously read to require property-tax payment)
- Cornelius v. Los Angeles County MTA, 49 Cal.App.4th 1761 (1996) (Court of Appeal precedent bearing on § 526a standing)
- Dix v. Superior Court, 53 Cal.3d 442 (1991) (limits on public-interest standing where separation-of-powers concerns implicated)
- Save the Plastic Bag Coalition v. City of Manhattan Beach, 52 Cal.4th 155 (2011) (discusses public-right exception to usual beneficial-interest requirements)