Weast v. Rockport Financial, LLC
115 F. Supp. 3d 1018
E.D. Mo.2015Background
- Plaintiff Jessica Weast received a debt-collection letter from Rockport Financial seeking payment of $896 and stating a $3.00 "convenience fee" for credit/debit card payments; checks were to be made payable to a different entity.
- The letter also urged the recipient to call to avoid Rockport being "forced to pursue other means to collect the debt."
- Weast sued under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), alleging violations of 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692f(1), 1692e(2), and 1692f based on the convenience fee and allegedly threatening language.
- Rockport moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim, arguing (a) the convenience fee is a third‑party service charge not part of the debt, (b) Missouri law does not bar such fees, and (c) the letter’s language was not an unlawful threat.
- The court considered statutory text, CFPB supervisory commentary, FTC staff commentary, and precedent from other circuits regarding whether state-law silence permits incidental fees.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether charging a $3 convenience fee for card payments violates §1692f(1) | Fee is an incidental charge not authorized by the underlying contract and Missouri law is silent, so §1692f(1) bars it | Fee is a separate third‑party service charge; state law silence permits it and offering a no‑fee option (check) cures any problem | Denied dismissal; claim under §1692f(1) survives (fee may be prohibited when contract/state law do not authorize it) |
| Whether the letter falsely or misleadingly mischaracterized the amount of the debt under §1692e(2) | Letter created a false impression that the fee was part of the debt amount | Letter separately stated the balance and the optional fee, so no mischaracterization | Granted dismissal; §1692e(2) claim fails (no misleading characterization as a matter of law) |
| Whether language in the letter constituted an unfair/unconscionable threat under §1692f | Statements about "other means" or pursuing collection equate to unlawful threats of litigation/credit damage | Language merely communicated consequences of nonpayment and was not an unlawful threat | Granted dismissal; §1692f claim based on alleged threats fails as a matter of law |
| Whether CFPB/FTC commentary controls interpretation of §1692f(1) | CFPB and FTC staff commentary support that state-law silence does not permit incidental fees | CFPB report is not binding and should not be adopted as controlling | Court adopts the interpretive approach (persuasive weight to commentary and other circuits) and applies it to deny dismissal on §1692f(1) claim |
Key Cases Cited
- Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (U.S. 2009) (pleading standard: plausibility required)
- Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (U.S. 2007) (antitrust pleading standard; plausibility framework)
- Pollice v. Nat’l Tax Funding, L.P., 225 F.3d 379 (3d Cir. 2000) (state‑law silence means incidental fees require contractual authorization)
- Tuttle v. Equifax Check, 190 F.3d 9 (2d Cir. 1999) (similar rule that absent state law authorization, contract must permit incidental fees)
- Peters v. Gen. Serv. Bureau, Inc., 277 F.3d 1051 (8th Cir. 2002) (unsophisticated‑consumer standard and application to collection letters)
- Strand v. Diversified Collection Serv., Inc., 380 F.3d 316 (8th Cir. 2004) (describes the unsophisticated‑consumer standard)
- Campbell v. MBI Assoc., Inc., 98 F. Supp. 3d 568 (E.D.N.Y. 2015) (treats convenience/transaction fees as incidental amounts under §1692f(1))
- Quinteros v. MBI Assocs., Inc., 999 F. Supp. 2d 434 (E.D.N.Y. 2014) (held similar fees fall within §1692f(1) when not authorized)