Wearry v. Cain, 136 S. Ct. 1002

Background

In April 1998 Eric Walber was murdered; Michael Wearry was convicted of capital murder in 2002 largely on the testimony of Sam Scott and Eric Brown and sentenced to death. No physical forensic evidence linked Wearry to the killing at trial.
Scott (State’s primary witness) gave multiple inconsistent statements before trial and changed his story repeatedly; Brown also had prior inconsistent statements and was incarcerated at time of trial.
After conviction, police and defense postconviction investigation revealed withheld evidence: (1) inmate statements suggesting Scott sought to “make sure Mike gets the needle” and that Scott coached another inmate to lie; (2) notes indicating Brown sought leniency from prosecutors for his cooperation; and (3) Randy Hutchinson’s medical records showing recent patellar-tendon surgery that could undercut Scott’s account of Hutchinson’s physical role.
Trial counsel conceded he conducted essentially no independent investigation into Wearry’s innocence and failed to locate many independent alibi witnesses later uncovered by collateral counsel.
Louisiana postconviction courts denied Brady and ineffective-assistance claims, finding no prejudice; the U.S. Supreme Court reversed on Brady grounds, holding the withheld evidence was material and undermined confidence in the verdict, and remanded for further proceedings.

Issues

Issue	Wearry's Argument	State's Argument	Held
Whether prosecution violated Brady by withholding impeachment/exculpatory evidence	Withheld inmate statements, Brown’s request for leniency, and Hutchinson’s medical records were favorable and material to impeach key witnesses and support alibi, undermining confidence in the verdict	Evidence was immaterial or cumulative; some facts (e.g., surgery) were known at trial; nondisclosed items would not likely have changed outcome	Yes. Suppression of the cumulative undisclosed evidence violated due process under Brady; reversal and remand ordered
Standard for materiality under Brady	Materiality requires showing reasonable likelihood the evidence could affect jury judgment or undermine confidence in verdict	State urged a stricter standard or argued the evidence was not material	Court reaffirmed that evidence is material if it could ‘undermine confidence’ in the verdict; acquittal need not be more likely than not
Whether state court properly evaluated materiality	Should have evaluated cumulative effect of withheld evidence, not piece-by-piece	State courts evaluated items in isolation and emphasized reasons jurors might discount them	Court held state courts misapplied Kyles by failing cumulative analysis and misweighing impact; reversed
Whether summary reversal without full briefing or argument was appropriate	Wearry sought relief on certiorari papers; Court may summarily decide egregious misapplications of settled law	Dissent argued fact-intensive Brady question required full briefing and adversarial argument and AEDPA/federal habeas path	Majority concluded summary reversal appropriate given clear misapplication of settled Brady/Kyles principles; remanded (dissent disagreed)

Key Cases Cited

Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (prosecution duty to disclose evidence favorable to the accused)
Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972) (Brady rule applies to impeachment evidence affecting witness credibility)
Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959) (conviction may be invalidated when state allows false testimony to go uncorrected)
Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419 (1995) (materiality requires cumulative evaluation of withheld evidence)
Smith v. Cain, 565 U.S. 73 (2012) (Brady materiality standard: evidence need only undermine confidence in verdict)
Youngblood v. West Virginia, 547 U.S. 867 (2006) (Brady applies where evidence known to police but not disclosed by prosecution)
Porter v. McCollum, 558 U.S. 30 (2009) (per curiam) (counsel’s inadequate investigation into mitigating evidence can violate Sixth Amendment)
Sears v. Upton, 561 U.S. 945 (2010) (per curiam) (Court has summarily corrected egregious postconviction errors in capital cases)