Wayne D. Anderson, II v. State
Background
- Anderson pleaded Alford to lewd conduct with a minor and a sentencing-enhancement based on a prior sex offense; he was sentenced to a unified 40-year sentence with a 15-year minimum.
- After direct appeal affirmed, Anderson filed a pro se post-conviction petition alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failing to present mental-health evidence supporting plea withdrawal.
- The district court appointed post-conviction counsel, issued a notice of intent to dismiss the petition for failure to state facts entitling relief, and granted two timeline extensions for Anderson to respond.
- Anderson filed pro se motions to proceed pro se, dismiss court-appointed counsel, and extend time again, claiming counsel failed to obtain documents and interview witnesses.
- At a status conference (Anderson absent; counsel present), counsel reported investigator follow-up but no evidence supporting amendment; the court denied Anderson’s motions as unsupported and untimely and then summarily dismissed the petition.
- Anderson appealed, arguing the court abused its discretion in denying his motions and in refusing to recognize a right of self-representation in post-conviction proceedings.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Anderson) | Defendant's Argument (State) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Right to proceed pro se / dismiss appointed counsel | Post-conviction petitioners should have civil-case right to self-representation and to discharge counsel | No established right to counsel in post-conviction; appointment is discretionary, so no cognizable claim of ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel | Court need not decide existence of self-rep right; denied motion because ineffective-assistance claim against appointed counsel is not a basis to avoid dismissal |
| Motion for continuance to gather witnesses/documents | Needs more time to obtain Canyon County medical/detention records and witness statements to amend petition | Two prior extensions granted; defendant’s counsel investigated and found no basis for amendment; Anderson gave no factual proffer or requested period | Denial of further extension was within discretion as motion was unsupported, untimely, and would have caused undue delay |
| Validity of alleging ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel | Such ineffective assistance supports dismissal of appointed counsel and continuance to develop claims | There is no constitutional right to effective assistance in post-conviction proceedings; where there is no right to counsel, there can be no deprivation of effective assistance | Court correctly held ineffective-assistance of post-conviction counsel is not a permissible ground to avoid dismissal |
| Whether district court abused its discretion overall | Denial of motions was arbitrary and prevented Anderson from presenting evidence | Court applied discretionary standards, considered timeliness and counsel’s reports, and reasonably denied relief | Court did not abuse discretion; order denying motions affirmed |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Anderson, 156 Idaho 230, 322 P.3d 312 (Ct. App.) (direct-appeal affirmation of conviction)
- Murphy v. State, 156 Idaho 389, 327 P.3d 365 (Ct. App.) (no constitutional right to effective assistance in post-conviction proceedings)
- Grant v. State, 156 Idaho 598, 329 P.3d 380 (Ct. App.) (appointment of counsel in post-conviction is discretionary)
- Hall v. State, 156 Idaho 125, 320 P.3d 1284 (Ct. App.) (trial court continuance standard reviewed for abuse of discretion)
- Sun Valley Shopping Ctr., Inc. v. Idaho Power Co., 119 Idaho 87, 803 P.2d 993 (Idaho 1991) (three-tiered review of discretionary decisions)
- Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1 (1983) (broad trial-court discretion on continuances; denial is violation only if arbitrary)
- Ungar v. Sarafite, 376 U.S. 575 (1964) (due-process limits on insisting upon expeditiousness)
- State v. Cagle, 126 Idaho 794, 891 P.2d 1054 (Ct. App.) (factors relevant to continuance requests)