Wayne County v. Afscme Local 3317
928 N.W.2d 709
Mich. Ct. App.2018Background
- Wayne County entered a consent agreement under Act 436 after a declared financial emergency; the agreement (plus Act 436) suspended the County’s duty to engage in mandatory collective bargaining from Sept 20, 2015 until Oct 1, 2018 (the collective-bargaining suspension period).
- The Union (AFSCME Local 3317) filed four unfair labor practice (ULP) charges with MERC alleging various PERA violations arising before and during the suspension period.
- The County argued MERC lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to adjudicate ULPs during the suspension, and moved for summary disposition; the ALJ denied that motion for the ULPs (except potentially for claims solely about bargaining during the suspension).
- MERC ruled that it retained subject-matter jurisdiction over ULP charges filed before, during, or after the suspension period and that charges alleging bargaining failures during the suspension would be dismissed for failure to state a claim (not for lack of jurisdiction).
- The County appealed to the Court of Appeals challenging MERC’s jurisdictional ruling; the court reviewed statutory text and precedent and affirmed MERC.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Does Act 436 divest MERC of subject-matter jurisdiction over ULP charges during a consent-agreement suspension of mandatory collective bargaining? | Union: Act 436 does not remove MERC’s exclusive jurisdiction over ULPs; MERC must decide whether particular charges state a claim. | County: The consent agreement and Act 436 make the County "not subject to" §15(1) of PERA and thus MERC lacks jurisdiction to adjudicate ULPs tied to bargaining during the suspension (and, County argued, even some pre-suspension claims). | Held: MERC retains subject-matter jurisdiction over ULP charges before, during, and after the suspension; Act 436 does not divest MERC of jurisdiction. |
| If MERC has jurisdiction, how should claims that allege refusal to bargain during the suspension be treated? | Union: MERC/ALJ should adjudicate and determine merits; some claims arise from conduct before suspension. | County: Such claims are non-justiciable while suspension is in effect; MERC cannot grant relief. | Held: Claims alleging a refusal to bargain that occurred during the suspension do not state a claim and should be dismissed on that basis; MERC/ALJ must make that determination in the first instance. |
| Can Act 436 limit available remedies and thus negate MERC’s authority to hear ULPs? | Union: Remedy limitations (e.g., inability to order bargaining during suspension) do not eliminate MERC’s subject-matter jurisdiction. | County: If no duty exists, there can be no breach and thus no ULP hearings should be authorized. | Held: Limits on remedies do not affect MERC’s jurisdiction to adjudicate ULPs; absence of a duty is a merits or pleading defect, not a jurisdictional bar. |
| Does legislative history or precedent require explicit text to divest an agency of jurisdiction? | Union: Legislature must clearly and unambiguously divest MERC if intended. | County: Argues Act 436’s language effectively removes MERC’s role regarding bargaining duty. | Held: Divestiture of jurisdiction must be clearly stated; Act 436 lacks language comparable to statutes that expressly remove agency jurisdiction, so no divestiture. |
Key Cases Cited
- Rockwell v. Crestwood Sch. Dist. Bd. of Ed., 393 Mich. 616 (discussing PERA as governing public-sector relations)
- Macomb County v. AFSCME Council 25, 494 Mich. 65 (agency expertise and remedial role under PERA)
- St. Clair Intermediate Sch. Dist. v. Intermediate Ed. Ass'n/Mich. Ed. Ass'n, 458 Mich. 540 (MERC has exclusive jurisdiction over unfair labor practices)
- Detroit Police Officers Ass'n v. Detroit, 391 Mich. 44 (MERC’s power to order bargaining as a remedial measure)
- Altman v. Nelson, 197 Mich. App. 467 (discussion of subject-matter jurisdiction principles)
- Baumgartner v. Perry Pub. Schs., 309 Mich. App. 507 (agency jurisdiction can be removed by clear statutory language)
- Martin v. Murray, 309 Mich. App. 37 (Act 436 provides tools for resolving local financial emergencies)