Watts v. State, 179 A.3d 929

Barrington Dean Watts entered an apartment, brandished a gun, fired three shots, and was charged with multiple offenses including two counts of first-degree assault (later tried on assault theories).
At trial, the judge instructed the jury on two modalities of second-degree assault: intent to frighten and battery (also possible: attempted battery).
Defense objected after instructions, arguing the jury could split (some jurors find one modality, others another) and thus unanimity as to modality was required; the court noted the exception and overruled.
Jury convicted Watts of two counts of first-degree assault and other charges; the Court of Special Appeals affirmed.
The Court of Appeals granted certiorari to decide (1) whether the objection was preserved under Md. Rule 4-325(e) and (2) whether the assault statute contemplates distinct crimes (requiring unanimity) or a single crime with multiple modalities.

Issue	Watts' Argument	State's Argument	Held
Whether Watts preserved his objection to lack of a unanimity instruction under Md. Rule 4-325(e)	Counsel’s bench objection after charge (stating jury could split 6–6) preserved the issue without requesting a specific curative instruction	Error unpreserved because defense did not request a particular unanimity/curative instruction after charge	Preserved: substantial compliance with Rule 4-325(e) where objection was stated on record, judge noted exception, and overruled; no requirement to request a particular curative instruction
Whether battery, attempted battery, and intent to frighten are separate crimes requiring jury unanimity as to modality	These are distinct crimes; jury must unanimously agree which occurred (relying on pre-consolidation cases)	The 1996 consolidated assault statute created a single offense (second-degree assault) with multiple modalities; unanimity as to modality unnecessary	Held they are modalities of one crime (second-degree assault); no unanimity instruction required as long as jury unanimously finds a modality of assault

Lamb v. State, 93 Md. App. 422 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1992) (defines assault to include battery, attempted battery, and intent to frighten)
Robinson v. State, 353 Md. 683 (Md. 1999) (1996 assault statute revisions abrogated common law and consolidated assault scheme)
Rice v. State, 311 Md. 116 (Md. 1987) (when statute consolidates alternative means into one crime, unanimity as to particular means is not required)
Gore v. State, 309 Md. 203 (Md. 1987) (explains preservation requirements for jury instruction objections under Rule 4-325(e))
Bennett v. State, 230 Md. 562 (Md. 1963) (substantial compliance can preserve an instructional objection)
Ford v. State, 330 Md. 682 (Md. 1993) (discusses assault and battery relationship under common law; not dispositive after consolidation)