Watkins v. Tregre, 997 F.3d 275

Denise Watkins, a Black dispatch supervisor with ~17 years at St. John the Baptist Parish Sheriff’s Office, suffers from severe anxiety.
Feb 9, 2018: Watkins was counseled about performance issues (including sleeping on duty); no discipline then.
Feb 20, 2018: Watkins submitted a doctor’s note stating she required three 24-hour shifts off per week for anxiety; she followed up by email Feb 23 asking when leave would start.
Feb 22, 2018: Lieutenant Carmouche filed a disciplinary-review-board request listing five infractions; the board met Mar 1 and reviewed only sleeping on the job, unanimously recommending termination.
Mar 2, 2018: Sheriff Tregre approved the board recommendation and fired Watkins; a white supervisor, Joe Oubre, had previously been caught sleeping but received only counseling.
Procedural posture: District court granted summary judgment for the Sheriff. The Fifth Circuit vacated and remanded, finding genuine disputes of material fact as to pretext on both Title VII and FMLA claims.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Title VII – race discrimination (disparate treatment)	Watkins: she was treated worse than similarly situated white supervisor (Oubre); proffered poor-performance reason is pretext.	Tregre: fired for legitimate, nondiscriminatory poor performance (sleeping and other deficiencies).	Reversed district court; genuine dispute of material fact exists on pretext (comparator evidence supports disparate treatment).
FMLA – retaliatory discharge	Watkins: doctor’s note and follow-up email were FMLA-protected; close timing (note Feb 20 → board request Feb 22 → firing Mar 2) and evidence that sleeping is not normally terminable show pretext/causation.	Tregre: Watkins didn’t properly request FMLA leave (or even if she did, legitimate nonretaliatory reason—sleeping on the job—motivated firing).	Reversed district court; timing plus evidence undermining the proffered reason create a genuine dispute of material fact on pretext/retaliation.

McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) (burden-shifting framework for circumstantial discrimination/retaliation claims)
Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133 (2000) (employer’s false explanation may permit inference of discrimination)
Tolan v. Cotton, 572 U.S. 650 (2014) (at summary judgment courts must view evidence in light most favorable to nonmoving party)
Laxton v. Gap Inc., 333 F.3d 572 (5th Cir. 2003) (‘‘substantial evidence’’ standard for showing pretext)
Outley v. Luke & Assocs., Inc., 840 F.3d 212 (5th Cir. 2016) (application of McDonnell Douglas framework)
Brown v. Wal-Mart Stores E., L.P., 969 F.3d 571 (5th Cir. 2020) (pretext can be proven by any evidence that casts doubt on employer’s justification)
Strong v. Univ. Healthcare Sys., L.L.C., 482 F.3d 802 (5th Cir. 2007) (temporal proximity alone is generally insufficient to establish causation/pretext)
Wallace v. Methodist Hosp. Sys., 271 F.3d 212 (5th Cir. 2001) (requirements for comparator evidence in disparate-treatment claims)
Ameristar Airways, Inc. v. Admin. Review Bd., U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 650 F.3d 562 (5th Cir. 2011) (close timing between protected activity and adverse action carries significant weight in pretext inquiry)
Tatum v. S. Co. Servs., 930 F.3d 709 (5th Cir. 2019) (McDonnell Douglas framework applied to FMLA retaliation claims)