Watkins v. Pough
2017 Ohio 7026
Ohio Ct. App.2017Background
- Lance Pough was convicted in 2000 after a guilty plea to complicity to commit murder and sentenced to 15 years to life with concurrent firearm specification; he repeatedly challenged his conviction and sentence in state courts over many years.
- From 2002–2016 Pough filed multiple appeals, postconviction motions, original actions, and various trial‑court filings (the opinion summarizes over 60 filings across seven appeals before the Eleventh District).
- In June 2016 the Trumbull County Prosecutor filed a civil complaint under Ohio’s vexatious‑litigator statute, R.C. 2323.52, asking the court to declare Pough a vexatious litigator and to require leave before he files further actions.
- The trial court denied Pough’s motion to dismiss, considered Watkins’ motion for summary judgment (filed August 11, 2016), and granted it on October 3, 2016, declaring Pough a vexatious litigator; Pough appealed.
- The Eleventh District affirmed: it held the judgment final (despite Civ.R. 54(B) language being unnecessary), rejected the argument that a prematurely filed summary‑judgment motion required reversal, and found Pough’s pattern of repeat, meritless filings supported a vexatious‑litigator designation; a judge dissented.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Watkins) | Defendant's Argument (Pough) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Finality / Civ.R. 54(B) language | Order final because court resolved all claims; Civ.R. 54(B) language was unnecessary but harmless | Judgment not final while counterclaim remained; Civ.R. 54(B) finding improper | Court ruled order was final: it had addressed all issues (including constitutionality) so appeal was proper |
| Premature summary‑judgment filing | Motion timely under Civ.R. 56 because responsive time had passed by decision on motion to dismiss; Pough had opportunity to respond | Motion filed before Pough’s responsive period had technically expired; so it was premature | Court found no reversible error: Pough answered, opposed, had opportunity to be heard; no substantial rights affected |
| Scope: whether criminal filings count toward vexatious conduct | Postconviction motions, collateral challenges, and original actions are civil in nature and may be considered | Criminal‑conviction appeals should not count; some postconviction filings relate to criminal process and should not alone justify vexatious label | Court held many of Pough’s postconviction and collateral civil filings were properly considered; criminal direct appeal excluded but subsequent civil collateral actions may be counted |
| Vexatious‑litigator designation & constitutionality of statute | Pough habitually and persistently filed repetitious, procedurally defective, and legally meritless filings; statute is constitutional | Pough argued statute unconstitutional and that his filings did not rise to vexatious conduct | Court granted summary judgment: R.C. 2323.52 is constitutional (per Mayer) and Pough’s long pattern of repetitive, unmeritorious filings supported designation |
Key Cases Cited
- Wisintainer v. Elcen Power Strut Co., 67 Ohio St.3d 352 (trial court factual determinations on Civ.R. 54(B) entitled to deference) (1993)
- Mayer v. Bristow, 91 Ohio St.3d 3 (vexatious‑litigator statute upheld as constitutional) (2000)
- Grafton v. Ohio Edison Co., 77 Ohio St.3d 102 (de novo standard for appellate review of summary judgment) (1996)
- Indus. Risk Insurers v. Lorenz Equip. Co., 69 Ohio St.3d 576 (trial courts may take judicial notice of their own dockets) (1994)
- State v. Calhoun, 86 Ohio St.3d 279 (postconviction proceeding is a collateral civil attack, not a criminal appeal) (1999)