515 F.Supp.3d 500
M.D. La.2021Background
- On September 14, 2019, Margaret Watkins's husband (Melvin Watkins) left a family gathering after a disturbance; as he pulled away in his car a deputy, James M. Hammett, arrived.
- Plaintiff alleges Hammett, within nine seconds of arriving, fired two shots through the front windshield into Mr. Watkins’s chest and then fired additional shots from the driver’s side; the car crashed and Mr. Watkins died (coroner ruled homicide).
- Plaintiff sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (alleging Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment violations) and asserted state-law assault and battery; Sheriff Gautreaux was dismissed and Hammett remained the only defendant.
- Hammett moved to dismiss, arguing (inter alia) failure to plead facts showing an unreasonable use of force and entitlement to qualified immunity; Plaintiff opposed, focusing on Fourth Amendment excessive-force and state-law claims.
- The Court found Plaintiff failed to overcome qualified immunity for her § 1983 excessive-force claim and dismissed those federal claims without prejudice, but ruled Plaintiff had pleaded sufficient facts to state a viable state-law assault-and-battery claim.
- The Court granted Plaintiff 28 days to amend her § 1983 claims; failure to cure would lead to dismissal with prejudice and likely termination of supplemental jurisdiction over state claims.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Hammett’s use of deadly force violated the Fourth Amendment (excessive force) | Watkins: Mr. Watkins was unarmed, not threatening, simply leaving; shots fired within 9 seconds without warning; therefore force was objectively unreasonable | Hammett: Facts plausibly show perceived danger from a moving vehicle; officer reasonably believed deadly force might be necessary | Court: Plaintiff's factual allegations are insufficient at pleading stage to overcome qualified immunity; § 1983 excessive-force claim dismissed without prejudice (for now) |
| Whether Hammett is entitled to qualified immunity on the § 1983 claim | Watkins: Garner and related precedent bar shooting an unarmed nonthreatening suspect; this is an “obvious” case | Hammett: Existing precedent supports officer discretion where vehicle may be used as deadly weapon; no clearly established law bars his conduct here | Court: Qualified immunity applies because plaintiff did not identify controlling precedent making Hammett’s conduct clearly unlawful to every reasonable officer |
| Whether state-law assault and battery claim survives | Watkins: State-law claim pleads Mr. Watkins posed no danger and less-lethal alternatives existed | Hammett: State claim should fail for same reasons federal claim fails | Court: State-law claim survives; totality-of-circumstances pleading is sufficient at this stage to allege unreasonable force under Louisiana law |
| Whether Plaintiff should be allowed to amend | Watkins: Requests leave to amend if court finds more facts are needed | Hammett: (opposed implicitly via dismissal motion) | Court: Grants one more opportunity to amend § 1983 claims within 28 days; failure to cure will likely yield dismissal with prejudice and possible loss of supplemental jurisdiction over state claims |
Key Cases Cited
- Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985) (deadly force unconstitutional against unarmed, nondangerous fleeing suspect)
- Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989) (excessive-force claims judged by Fourth Amendment reasonableness test)
- Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194 (2004) (use-of-force/qualified-immunity inquiry must be context-specific)
- White v. Pauly, 137 S. Ct. 548 (2017) (general legal statements are insufficient to clearly establish a right except in an obvious case)
- Kisela v. Hughes, 138 S. Ct. 1148 (2018) (clearly established law requires precedent placing the constitutional question beyond debate)
- Plumhoff v. Rickard, 572 U.S. 765 (2014) (officers need not cease firing until the threat has ended)
- Carnaby v. City of Houston, 636 F.3d 183 (5th Cir. 2011) (deadly-force seizure analysis and reasonableness balancing)
- Davis v. Romer, [citation="600 F. App'x 926"] (5th Cir. 2015) (officer on running board reasonably perceived risk from fleeing vehicle)
- Malbrough v. Stelly, [citation="814 F. App'x 798"] (5th Cir. 2020) (vehicle can constitute a deadly weapon; officer split-second decisions evaluated objectively)