Waterman Family Ltd. Partnership v. Boomer, 173 A.3d 1069

Background

Waterman owned 148 acres (Wheatlands Farm) in Queen Anne’s County zoned CS (countryside); it petitioned the Town of Queenstown to annex and rezone the land to PRC (Planned Regional Commercial).
Under LG §4-416, municipal annexation generally gives the municipality exclusive zoning authority, but municipal rezoning that permits a substantially different use or substantially higher density is delayed for five years unless the county gives express approval (a county "waiver").
The Town approved annexation (Sept. 24, 2014) and rezoning (Nov. 12, 2014), making the rezoning contingent on the County’s approval or the five-year lapse.
Outgoing Queen Anne’s County Commissioners passed Resolution 14-31 on Nov. 25, 2014, granting express approval; seven days after the newly elected commissioners took office, they passed Resolution 14-33 (Dec. 9, 2014) rescinding that approval.
Waterman and the Town sued to invalidate the rescission; the Circuit Court held the County could not rescind once approval was given. The Court of Special Appeals reversed; the Court of Appeals granted certiorari and affirmed the intermediate appellate court.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether a county may rescind its express approval (waiver) of municipal rezoning of recently annexed land before third-party rights vest	Waterman: County approval once given is final under LG §4-416; approval cannot be withdrawn (one-way ratchet)	County: Governing body retains common-law authority to rescind prior measures absent vested third-party rights; LG §4-416 is silent	County may rescind its prior approval before rights vest; rescission valid here
Whether LG §4-416 precludes rescission by implication	Waterman: Statute implies exclusive municipal jurisdiction once county approves; thus rescission would thwart statute's operation	County: Statute is silent on rescission and does not supersede common-law power of reconsideration	LG §4-416 does not abrogate county’s common-law rescission authority
Whether County Resolution 14-31 was a public local law that only a code county can repeal by resolution	Waterman: Resolutions affect both county and town and thus may not be "public local law"; procedural defects argued below	County/QACA: Resolution concerned county-local zoning consent and, if needed, would be a public local law under Article XI-F	Court: Regardless of classification, common law and Article XI-F authorize a code county to repeal its prior enactments; rescission permissible
Whether Waterman acquired vested rights during the two-week interval between approval and rescission	Waterman: No vested-rights argument raised as basis for reversal here	County: No vested rights were acquired because no development approvals or reliance occurred	Court: No vested rights existed; therefore rescission did not violate vested-rights protections

Key Cases Cited

Mathews v. Cassidy Turley Maryland, Inc., 435 Md. 584 (standard of appellate review for legal issues)
Mayor & Council of Rockville v. Rylyns Enterprises, Inc., 372 Md. 514 (history of municipal annexation/zoning and legislative background of LG §4-416)
Prince George’s County v. Sunrise Dev. Ltd. P’ship, 330 Md. 297 (vested rights in zoning context)
Prince George’s County v. Mayor & City Council of Laurel, 262 Md. 171 (municipal zoning authority precedent)
Beshore v. Town of Bel Air, 237 Md. 398 (municipal zoning precedent)
Northeast Plaza Assocs. v. Town of North East, 310 Md. 20 (limitations on municipal autonomy after annexation)
Md.-Nat’l Capital Park & Planning Comm’n v. Mayor & Council of Rockville, 272 Md. 550 (upholding five-year delay statute)
Del Maso v. Bd. of County Comm’rs, 182 Md. 200 (common-law principle: governing body may reconsider/rescind before rights vest)
State v. Fisher, 204 Md. 307 (legislative bodies cannot bind successors from repeal/modification)
Nordheimer v. Montgomery County, 307 Md. 85 (limitations on constraining successor legislative action)