455 F.Supp.3d 579
M.D. Tenn.2020Background
- Victim Faye Burns was found fatally stabbed in her apartment; wounds included a severed carotid artery and incised wounds under both breasts; no defensive wounds on hands and blood pattern suggested she was stabbed while lying down.
- Surveillance and a Dollar General receipt placed Waterford at the victim’s apartment the night before; victim made multiple calls from phone numbers assigned to Waterford; Waterford admitted an “altercation” in a recorded interview and asked about self-defense; she fled the state the next day.
- No forensic evidence tied Waterford to the killing at trial; police submitted some items for testing later and a TBI report (after trial) showed an unknown male DNA profile under the victim’s fingernails that excluded Waterford.
- Jury convicted Waterford of second-degree murder; trial court imposed a 40-year sentence as a Range II multiple offender; direct appeal and post-conviction relief were denied by Tennessee courts.
- Post-conviction DNA testing produced mixed results: fingernail scrape yielded unknown male DNA (excluding Waterford); knife blade and handle produced limited/inconclusive profiles; litigation focused on counsel’s failure to obtain/testing timing and alleged Brady/due-process violations.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Waterford) | Defendant's Argument (State) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sufficiency of evidence / self-defense | Evidence was circumstantial; identity not proven; alternative theories (self-defense, provoked passion) should reduce or negate conviction | Circumstantial proof (receipt, video, phone calls, confession, flight) and medical evidence supported jury’s verdict; jury could reject self-defense | Affirmed: evidence sufficient; jury reasonably rejected self-defense/voluntary manslaughter (Jackson standard) |
| Admissibility of prior convictions for impeachment (Rule 609) | Trial court erred in ruling aggravated-assault priors admissible and that would be prejudicial | Priors were not substantially similar such as to bar impeachment; discretion to admit for credibility | No relief: claim forfeited by not testifying; state-law evidentiary ruling not cognizable on habeas; procedurally defaulted federally |
| Excessive sentence / Eighth Amendment | Forty-year maximum sentence was greater than deserved; mitigating factors ignored | Trial court considered factors, relied on extensive criminal history and enhancements; within statutory range | No relief: sentence within state range; state-court sentencing review reasonable; federal claim unexhausted/defaulted |
| Ineffective assistance — failure to seek DNA testing pretrial | Counsel deficient for not requesting DNA testing that might have exculpated Waterford | Counsel made strategic choice given Waterford’s admissions and circumstantial evidence; testing could have created inculpatory evidence | No relief: state court reasonably applied Strickland — counsel’s choice was strategic, not deficient |
| Brady — suppression of fingernail DNA results | Prosecution suppressed exculpatory DNA results (unknown male) and delayed disclosure, violating Brady | Results either were not in prosecution’s possession before trial or, if disclosed after, were not material to change outcome | No relief: state court found no Brady violation — either no pretrial suppression or lack of materiality to undermine confidence in verdict |
| Due process — trial without DNA results | Trying Waterford without the favorable DNA evidence denied a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense | Post-trial DNA was favorable but not exonerating; record contained strong inculpatory circumstantial evidence; absence did not render trial fundamentally unfair | No relief on merits; court granted COA only on this claim due to close questions about jury exposure to investigator’s statements about DNA |
Key Cases Cited
- Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979) (standard for reviewing sufficiency of the evidence)
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (two-prong test for ineffective assistance of counsel)
- Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (prosecutor’s duty to disclose favorable, material evidence)
- Luce v. United States, 469 U.S. 38 (1984) (defendant must testify to preserve claim that impeachment ruling was erroneous)
- Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86 (2011) (AEDPA deference in assessing state-court application of federal law)
- Cavazos v. Smith, 565 U.S. 1 (2011) (reinforcing the high threshold for overturning jury verdicts on sufficiency grounds)
- Osborne v. District Attorney’s Office for the Third Judicial Dist. of Alaska, 557 U.S. 52 (2009) (limits on post-conviction extension of pretrial disclosure rights)
- Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39 (1987) (prosecutor’s disclosure obligations and in camera review guidance)