Waste Management of Louisiana v. River Birch, Inco
920 F.3d 958
| 5th Cir. | 2019Background
- After Hurricane Katrina, Mayor Ray Nagin used emergency powers to authorize a temporary landfill at Chef Menteur (Feb 2006); Waste Management operated that site under a City agreement and LDEQ emergency request.
- The New Orleans City Council and local residents opposed the landfill; Council passed a resolution condemning Nagin’s executive order (Apr 2006).
- Two weeks before Nagin’s May 20, 2006 re‑election runoff, defendants (River Birch, Heebe, Ward, Highway 90 LLC) caused four $5,000 donations (total $20,000) to Nagin through shell corporations (May 16, 2006); making contributions in another’s name violated Louisiana law.
- Henry Mouton, a former state commissioner, pled guilty in 2011 to accepting bribes to help close competing landfills; his factual proffer implicated defendants and identified a scheme targeting Chef Menteur; Mouton drafted/forwarded letters and threats of litigation regarding environmental harms.
- On July 13, 2006 Nagin announced he would not extend the executive order; the City closed the landfill Aug 14, 2006. Waste Management sued under civil RICO alleging defendants bribed Nagin (and Mouton) to cause the closure.
- The district court granted partial summary judgment dismissing RICO claims tied to the $20,000 contribution for lack of causation; the Fifth Circuit vacated and remanded, finding genuine fact disputes as to bribery and causation and reopening consideration of Mouton evidence.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the $20,000 campaign contribution constituted a bribe (RICO predicate under state bribery law) | Contribution, made through shell entities and timed near election/expiration, plus Mouton scheme and concealment, supports inference of specific intent to influence Nagin | Contributions are lawful political activity; no quid pro quo, no direct communications requesting action, and small relative amount | Jury question exists: circumstantial evidence (shell entities, timing, Mouton scheme, statutory violation) suffices to create a genuine dispute on bribery intent |
| Whether the alleged bribe was the but‑for and proximate cause of Nagin’s decision to close the landfill (RICO causation) | Sequence of events (re‑election, positive environmental tests June 30, reminder letter, then July affidavit declining extension), Mouton’s campaign, and officials’ surprise support inference that contribution influenced Nagin | Nagin’s executive order was explicitly temporary; strong political pressure and City Council opposition explain non‑renewal; no evidence tying contribution causally to decision | Causation for RICO is a fact question: reasonable jurors could infer but‑for and proximate causation from circumstantial record; summary judgment improper |
| Admissibility/relevance of Mouton evidence to show defendants’ intent | Mouton’s guilty plea and factual basis showing a scheme to shutter landfills are intrinsic evidence that can show motive/intent for defendants’ conduct | Defendants argued prior acts or unrelated conduct shouldn’t be used to infer bribery here | Fifth Circuit held Mouton evidence may be considered by a jury as intrinsic to the scheme; vacated district court’s dismissal excluding that evidence |
| Proper summary judgment standard application (Matsushita relevance) | Standard requires viewing inferences for non‑movant; Matsushita’s antitrust‑specific reasoning does not impose a heightened burden in civil RICO here | Matsushita (and its progeny) requires plaintiff to exclude innocent explanations where evidence is equally consistent with lawful conduct (political motive) | Majority: Matsushita’s antitrust‑specific economic rationale does not bar juror inferences from circumstantial evidence in RICO; denial of summary judgment appropriate. Dissent: Matsushita/Twombly principles counsel for dismissal absent evidence excluding political motives (dissents). |
Key Cases Cited
- Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986) (antitrust summary‑judgment framework; where ambiguous evidence is equally consistent with lawful conduct, plaintiff must show inference of wrongdoing is reasonable)
- Tolan v. Cotton, 572 U.S. 650 (2014) (on summary judgment, courts must credit nonmovant’s evidence and draw all justifiable inferences in their favor)
- Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986) (summary judgment standards; movant’s burden and nonmovant’s obligations to show genuine issue)
- Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986) (standard for assessing whether a genuine issue for trial exists at summary judgment)
- Bridge v. Phoenix Bond & Indem. Co., 553 U.S. 639 (2008) (RICO plaintiff must show but‑for causation for injury “by reason of” RICO violation)
- Hemi Group, LLC v. City of New York, 559 U.S. 1 (2010) (proximate cause in RICO requires direct relation between injury and injurious conduct)
- Anza v. Ideal Steel Supply Corp., 547 U.S. 451 (2006) (limits on RICO proximate cause; third‑party actions can break chain of causation)
- Holmes v. Sec. Inv’r Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258 (1992) (RICO proximate cause principles)
- United States v. Rice, 607 F.3d 133 (5th Cir. 2010) (intrinsic vs. 404(b) other‑acts evidence; intrinsic evidence admissible to complete the story of the crime)