Washtenaw Co Parks & Recreation Commn v. Vortex Aquatic Structures
355889
Mich. Ct. App.Mar 10, 2022Background
- In April 2012 Washtenaw County Parks & Recreation contracted with Vortex to design/construct a splash pad; contract specified it began April 10, 2012 and ended November 15, 2012.
- Article VI of the contract required Vortex to indemnify the County for "any and all liabilities" arising in connection with the contract; Article XXI stated the contract was the entire integrated agreement.
- The splash pad opened May 25, 2013; problems (leaks, pressure, structural issues) occurred from 2013 through 2019; County’s inspection in Nov 2019 documented defects.
- The County sent indemnity demand letters to Vortex in March 2020; Vortex did not respond and the County sued in June 2020 seeking a declaration and breach of the indemnity obligation.
- Vortex moved for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(8) arguing the contract’s durational term ended its indemnity duty on November 15, 2012; the trial court denied the motion.
- On interlocutory appeal the Court of Appeals reversed, holding the contract’s durational term applied to the indemnity clause and ordering summary disposition for Vortex.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the contract’s durational term (Nov. 15, 2012) applies to the indemnification provision | The indemnity clause creates an independent, perpetual obligation not limited by the contract’s end date | The indemnity clause contains no separate duration; absent a separate term, the contract’s durational provision controls | Court: durational term applies; indemnity duty ended Nov. 15, 2012 and plaintiff’s claim arose after termination (reversed trial court) |
| Whether Miller‑Davis means indemnity provisions are insulated from other contract terms | Miller‑Davis establishes indemnity is an "original and independent" obligation, so it should not be bound by the contract’s general duration | Miller‑Davis does not exempt indemnity clauses from construing the contract as a whole; specific-durational-rule (Kendzierski) controls | Court: Miller‑Davis does not create a durational exception; Kendzierski controls and durational term applies |
| Whether plaintiff may rely on an alleged 2014 contract or expand the record on appeal | Plaintiff suggested survival of claims under a 2014 agreement | Defendant opposed expansion; appeal limited to issues in the application and record below | Court: declined to consider any 2014-contract argument or extra-record materials; appeal limited to trial-court record |
Key Cases Cited
- Kendzierski v. Macomb County, 503 Mich 296 (2019) (if a specific provision lacks its own duration, the contract’s general durational term applies to that provision)
- Miller‑Davis Co. v. Ahrens Construction, Inc., 495 Mich 161 (2014) (an indemnity obligation creates a direct, primary liability independent of other performance obligations but must be construed from the contract language)
- Klapp v. United Ins. Group Agency, Inc., 468 Mich 459 (2003) (courts must give effect to every contract term and avoid interpretations that render provisions nugatory)
- Rory v. Continental Ins. Co., 473 Mich 457 (2005) (unambiguous contract provisions are enforced as written)
- Zaher v. Miotke, 300 Mich App 132 (2013) (standard for reviewing MCR 2.116(C)(8) motions)
