260 P.3d 991
Wash. Ct. App.2011Background
- Prudential Almon Realty (listing broker) had an exclusive listing with the Youngs, expired December 31, 2008, including a tail provision for a 365-day post-expiration sale to certain purchasers.
- In late 2008–early 2009, Eastmans sought to buy in Yakima; Dr. Place and Linda Rockwell, among others, interacted with the Youngs and Eastmans, with Prudential signs and brochure in the Youngs' yard noted.
- Eastmans eventually made an offer for the Youngs’ property through Creekside Realty; the Youngs initially reserved a commission payment to Creekside but later rejected it in their counteroffers.
- Prudential learned of the Eastman offer and discussed the commission; Youngs argued Prudential’s tail provision did not apply and declined further involvement.
- Sale closed in March 2009 between the Youngs and Eastmans; Creekside was paid $5,000; Prudential sued for a tail commission, asserting the tail provision satisfied by the manner in which Prudential’s marketing brought the property to attention.
- The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the Youngs, rejecting Prudential’s tail-claim theory and awarding the Youngs attorney fees; Prudential appealed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Prudential is entitled to a tail commission. | Prudential contends the tail provision applies since knowledge of the property reached Eastmans through Prudential's signs/advertising. | Youngs argue the tail provision is not triggered because the sale arose from other efforts and Prudential’s marketing did not causally bring the buyer to the purchase. | Tail provision governs; material facts disputed; remand. |
| Whether Prudential’s efforts during the listing period were at least a minimal causal factor for the later sale. | Prudential’s signage and marketing created the chain of events leading to the sale. | Under Lloyd Hammerstad and Roger Crane, Prudential’s efforts were not minimally causal. | Disputed facts; not decided as a matter of law; remand. |
| Whether the trial court correctly applied the tail provision interpretation and related extrinsic evidence rules. | Terms like 'directly or indirectly' are broad and should be construed to include indirect results from Prudential’s marketing. | The court should adhere to the contract language and prior case law; there is ambiguity needing extrinsic evidence. | Facts and inferences support Prudential; legal issues require trial to resolve. |
Key Cases Cited
- Roger Crane & Assocs. v. Felice, 875 P.2d 705 (Wash. App. 1994) (tail provision context; differentiates procuring-cause doctrine)
- Lloyd Hammerstad, Inc. v. Saunders, 495 P.2d 349 (Wash. App. 1972) (minimal causal relationship required for tail provision)
- Korstad v. Hoffman, 35 Cal. Rptr. 61 (Cal. App. Supp. 2d 1963) (introductory concept of 'introduced' in tail-like provisions)
- Clients' Serv., Inc. v. Pupo, 430 P.2d 552 (Wash. 1967) (interpretation of tail provision language and intent)
- Berg v. Hudesman, 801 P.2d 222 (Wash. 1990) (contract interpretation framework; extrinsic evidence admissibility)
- Paradise Orchards Gen. P'ship v. Fearing, 94 P.3d 372 (Wash. App. 2004) (contract interpretation principles; party-intent focus)
- Prof'ls 100 v. Prestige Realty, Inc., 911 P.2d 1358 (Wash. App. 1996) (procuring-cause framework; tail provisions intersection)
- Willis v. Champlain Cable Corp., 748 P.2d 621 (Wash. 1988) (procuring-cause-like analysis in commission disputes)