Washington Mutual Bank v. Coughlin, 145 A.3d 408

In July 2008 Washington Mutual (later substituted by JPMorgan Chase) commenced foreclosure on Mystic property purchased by Linda and Daniel Coughlin in 2004; the Coughlins intended it as a summer/second home and signed a second-home rider at closing.
The Coughlins’ primary residence at the time of purchase (and through 2008) was a Norwalk home; they moved to the Mystic property in 2009 after the Norwalk house was foreclosed.
General Statutes § 8-265ee(a) (part of EMAP) requires a mortgagee to mail notice before commencing foreclosure where the mortgage meets standards in § 8-265ff(e), including that the secured property is the mortgagor’s principal residence.
On the eve of trial (electronically filed), the Coughlins moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, claiming statutorily required EMAP notice was not given; plaintiff filed an affidavit asserting notice had been mailed as a precaution.
The trial court denied the motion to dismiss without detailed findings; after trial it entered a strict foreclosure judgment and found the Coughlins did not make the Mystic property their permanent residence until 2009.
On appeal the court affirmed, holding EMAP notice was inapplicable because the property was not the mortgagors’ principal residence when the foreclosure was commenced in 2008.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether failure to give § 8-265ee EMAP notice deprived the court of subject matter jurisdiction	EMAP notice requirement does not apply because the mortgaged property was not the defendants’ principal residence in July 2008	Failure to give the statutorily required EMAP notice divested the court of jurisdiction and required dismissal	Court affirmed denial of dismissal: EMAP inapplicable where property was not mortgagor’s principal residence when suit commenced
Whether the property was the mortgagors’ principal residence in July 2008	The record (depositions, tax returns, second-home rider, trial findings) shows it was not	The Coughlins contended it was their principal residence and they did not receive EMAP notice	Court concluded, as a matter of law on the undisputed record and judicial admissions, the property was not the principal residence in 2008

JPMorgan Chase Bank Nat’l Assn. v. Simoulidis, 161 Conn. App. 133 (discusses standard of review for motions to dismiss)
Dorry v. Garden, 313 Conn. 516 (plenary review for statutory construction; presumptions favoring jurisdiction)
Penn v. Irizarry, 220 Conn. 682 (use of conjunctive language in statutes requires all conditions be met)
State v. Reagan, 209 Conn. 1 (when appellate court may draw factual conclusions from the record)
Funaro v. Baisley, 57 Conn. App. 636 (use of dictionary/common meaning in statutory interpretation)
Jones v. Forst, 41 Conn. App. 341 (judicial admissions defined)